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Analysis of TRIPS Agreement and the Justification of International IP Rights 







   The entry of the TRIPS Agreement has seen the developing countries and the least 
developed countries (LDCs) suffer from the excessive burden of obligations imposed under 
the Agreement to embrace and implement a higher standard of intellectual property  
protection. One of the areas where the impact of the measures are most felt is on accessibility 
to affordable medicines for frontline treatment of diseases in developing countries and LDCs, 
where the majority of the HIV/AIDS sufferers come from. This inevitable plight, although 
well known, and posited by the developing countries and LDCs during the Uruguay round of 
negotiations, was overlooked. This also necessitated the Doha Deceleration, which does not 
seem to have addressed the problem. The developed countries have also successfully utilised 
the TRIPS Agreement’s intellectual property rights protection criteria as a benchmark, to 
develop a much higher intellectual property rights protection agenda through the 
introduction of TRIPS-plus provisions in bilateral and other plurilateral agreements entered 
into with developing countries. The winners in the game are the patent holding 
pharmaceutical corporations, software corporations, media corporations, and the developed 
countries where they are incorporated. The one at the receiving end are the developing 
countries and the LDCs who were promised technology transfer to build a modern economy 
by the developed countries, but are faced with multiple problems of non-availability of 
affordable medicines for health care, besides others. This article seeks to study the 
justification for an extended intellectual property rights protection under the TRIPS 
Agreement through an analysis of the philosophical underpinnings of the intellectual 
property rights and the patent regime. It will be argued that the TRIPS Agreement is a major 
obstacle that the developing countries and the LDCs have been made to face as Members of 
the WTO, with no end in sight for their miseries, and that the only possible solution is a 
review, or amendment of the TRIPS Agreement.   
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Introduction: TRIPS Agreement 
The Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement was 
introduced through the World Trade Organization (WTO) in January 1995. The TRIPS 
Agreement is viewed as the most important instrument in the vision for a global governance 
of IP rights protection, and is one of the most controversial agreements of the multilateral 
trading system. The expansion of International intellectual property rights protection through 
the TRIPS Agreement has presented the developing countries and least developed countries 
 




(LDCs) with hitherto unknown challenges in various fields including health care, and 
agriculture. The introduction of the Agreement has witnessed an exponential price rise of life 
saving drugs, and has created barriers in the access to affordable medicines in developing 
countries and LDCs. This price rise has also severely impacted on national commitments to 
health care and other welfare programmes. The flexibilities contained in the TRIPS 
Agreement have not been fully utilised by the developing countries and LDCs due to a 
number of reasons. In some cases lobbying by transnational pharmaceutical corporations and 
political reasons had caused the delays in the implementation, and in some other cases the 
introduction of TRIPS-plus provisions in Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) by developed 
countries had thwarted the introduction of such flexibilities.   
The TRIPS Agreement, which has far-reaching implications on international 
intellectual property rights protection, was drafted at the behest of patent right holders and 
strongly backed by developed countries.1 The Agreement sets a minimum standard for the 
protection of intellectual property rights and obligates, both developed and developing 
country Member States to grant product patents for a period of 20 years in all fields of 
technology, including pharmaceutical patents.2 It requires all Member States to comply with 
pre-existing international agreements on intellectual property,3 and also to afford equal 
treatment to citizens of all other Member States.4 The Agreement, to ensure effective 
protection to both domestic and international patent holders’ rights, requires all Member 
States to establish enforcement mechanisms both domestically, and at their national borders.5 
The WTO Member States are also obligated to introduce domestic intellectual property laws 
establishing minimum levels of protection for the intellectual property rights identified in the 
Agreement, subject to transitional arrangements.6 In effect, the Agreement has globalised 
intellectual property rights, despite the profound asymmetries existing amongst WTO 
Member States in their levels of scientific and technological development.7 The Agreement 
expressly addresses private rights of economic operators (intellectual property rights holders), 
unlike the GATT and other WTO agreements, which formally grant rights to Member States 
and only address rights of traders indirectly.8 While the Agreement creates new rights for 
producers of intellectual property, and obligations for the users and consumers, it barely 
 
1 See generally, SK Sell, Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights, Vol. 88 
(Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
2 Under the Paris Convention for Protection of Industrial Property 1883, contracting parties were permitted to 
exclude patent protection in certain sectors such as pharmaceuticals, and permitted to determine the duration of 
patent rights, and grant compulsory license for a variety of reasons. Most of these flexibilities are not available 
under the TRIPS Agreement.  
3 For instance, The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 1883 (as revised on 14 July 1967), 
and The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1886.  
4 CM Ho, ‘An Introduction to TRIPS’ in CM Ho, Access to Medicine in Global Economy: International 
Agreement on Patents and Related Rights (Oxford, 2011) 57. 
5 J Sundaram, ‘Brazil’s Implementation of TRIPS Flexibilities: Ambitious Missions, Early Implementation, and 
the Plans for Reform’ Information & Communications Technology Law Vol. 23 Issue 2 (2014) 81-116. 
6 Part VI of the TRIPS Agreement provides for Transitional Arrangements under Article 65 and Article 66 with 
respect to developing countries and LDCs respectively.  
7 See generally, CM Correa, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (Oxford, 2007).   
8 T Cottier, ‘The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights’ in PFJ Macrory, AE 
Appleton, and MG Plummer (eds) The World Trade Organisation: Legal Economic and Political Analysis Vol. 




speaks about the rights of the users of intellectual property,9 which is uncharacteristic of an 
international agreement created and administered by a world governing body.10    
The Agreement also fully incorporates substantive rules enshrined in other 
international agreements and Conventions previously administered by the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO).11 Interestingly, the international Conventions administered by 
the WIPO were only focused on laying down procedures to streamline patent applications in 
countries already granting patents, and to ensure the equal treatment of both foreign and 
domestic patent applications.12 The Agreement does not strive to achieve uniformity in 
international intellectual property laws,13 and it often leaves undefined the minimum 
standards to be followed by Member States, creating room for variations in national 
legislations.14 Not surprisingly, the inclusion of international IP protection through the TRIPS 
Agreement was vehemently opposed during the Uruguay Round of Negotiations by both 
developing countries and LDCs. The TRIPS Agreement’s advantages and disadvantages have 
been discussed in detail in a number of scholarly works, where it has been argued by some 
that a global intellectual property rights protection regime under the TRIPS Agreement poses 
a serious threat, or barrier, in achieving the goal of access to medicines both in developing 
countries and UDCs.15 Other serious criticisms to emerge are with regards to the GATT for 
including an international intellectual property protection in the agenda for negotiation in the 
Uruguay Round,16 and also the shortcomings and the failure of the negotiation process in not 
fully appreciating the opposition to the inclusion of intellectual property rights in the 
Uruguay round of GATT.17  
This article analyses the TRIPS Agreement from a select few perspectives to include 
the study of the benefits of the Agreement under economic law principles; seek justification 
from a human rights perspective to the question if it was wise to equate private rights of 
pharmaceutical patent right holders with access to medicine, especially when there was an 
overwhelming body of evidence that the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement will see 
the price of essential drugs rise exponentially; and if there was a level playing field in the 
negotiations when many member countries did not even have elementary levels of intellectual 
property standards due to weaknesses in the national economy, knowledge economy, and 
 
9 See, e.g., A Kur and HG Ruse-Khan, ‘Enough is Enough - The Notion of Binding Ceilings in International 
Intellectual Property Protection’ Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property, Competition & Tax Law, 
Research Paper Series No. 09-01, (2008) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1326429> accessed 13 May 2014. 
10 Sundaram (n 5). 
11 Cottier (n 8). See also UNCTAD-ICTSD, ‘Resource Book on TRIPS and Development’ (2005) 3. Before the 
entry into force of the TRIPS Agreement, international intellectual property rights were regulated through a 
patchwork of treaties administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), including the Paris 
Convention on Industrial Property 1883, and the Berne Convention on Literary and Artistic Works 1886. See 
also Sundaram (n 5).  
12 The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Article 3, 20 March 1883, revised 14 July 
1967, 21 UST 1583, 828 UNTS 305 (requiring equal treatment for foreign applicants); Patent Cooperation 
Treaty, 19 June 1970, 28.7 UST 7645, 1160 UNTS 232 (providing a streamlined process for submitting patent 
applications in multiple jurisdictions). National treatment under the Paris Convention, however, does not require 
Member States to provide any particular standard of protection, but the same level of protection provided to 
domestic work also be provided to foreign works. DG Richards, Intellectual Property Rights and Global 
Capitalism: The Political Economy of the TRIPS Agreement (ME Sharpe, 2004) 4; See also Ho (n 4). 
13 Correa (n 7). The author argues that the Agreement does not set forth a uniform law on intellectual property, 
but only proposes minimum standards which may be differently implemented in Member States.     
14 Sundaram (n 5). 
15 Sell (n 1). 
16 P Drahos, ‘Expanding Intellectual Property’s Empire: The Role of FTAs’ Regulatory Institutions Network, 





infrastructure. This article is divided into four parts, with the first part presenting the 
introduction to the TRIPS Agreement and the premise of the current research, the second part 
providing the background to the entry of international intellectual property rights 
enforcement into the WTO through extensive lobbying from pharmaceutical patent holders 
from developed countries, which was ably supported by the music and motion picture 
industry and the software industry, to move the administration of intellectual property rights 
enforcement from the WIPO to the WTO. The discussions will include the failed attempts of 
the developing countries and LDCs to prevent the introduction of international intellectual 
property right protection as a covered agreement under the WTO, and the measures taken to 
introduce TRIPS flexibilities and the passing of the Doha Declaration.  
The second part will also briefly outline the background to the introduction of 
intellectual property rights in the former colonies during the colonial era, which largely 
facilitated the implementation of an expanded intellectual property rights regime through the 
TRIPS Agreement. The third part will analyse the emergence of intellectual property rights 
and the legal justification in the 17th century, the philosophical and legal basis of modern 
intellectual property rights under the economic law principles to argue that it benefits only a 
handful of rights holding developed Member States of the WTO, while depriving the non-
rights holding Member States of any benefits. The third part will also closely analyse the 
TRIPS Agreement from a human rights perspective, and its impact on access to medicines in 
developing countries and LDCs. It will be argued that the international intellectual property 
rights protection regime, as it stands today, does not benefit and cannot benefit the 
developing countries and the LDCs, that it is primarily designed to benefit the rights holders 
and not the end users in developing countries and LDCs as it comes at a very high premium, 
and that any potential benefits to be derived from the regime is too onerous. The fourth part 
will discusses the findings and conclude, making suggestions as a way forward for the WTO 






2.1 Forum Shifting: Inclusion of Intellectual Property Rights Protection in the WTO 
The vision for an international intellectual property rights protection was initially 
conceived and promoted by patent rights holding transnational corporations from developed 
countries, which had campaigned relentlessly for the inclusion of an agreement on 
intellectual property rights in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.18 It was 
claimed by US industries, which included pharmaceutical corporations, that they suffered 
heavy losses from the absence of adequate protection of their intellectual property rights in 
foreign markets.19 A strong view exist amongst writers, that some twelve US corporations 
were primarily responsible for the lobbying that brought the TRIPS Agreement into 
existence.20 The TRIPS Agreement came to be an output of private nodal governance,21 with 
the process starting in the 1980s when one of the transnational pharmaceutical corporations 
 
18 Drahos (n16).  
19 AO Adede, ‘Origins and History of the TRIPS Negotiations’ in G Dutfield, Trading in Knowledge: 
Development Perspectives on TRIPS, Trade and Sustainability (ICTSD/Earthscan 2003) 23-35, 24.  
20 Sell (n 1); P Drahos and J Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge Economy? 
(Earthscan 2002); D Matthews, Globalising Intellectual Property Rights (Routledge 2002). 
21 Drahos (n 16). See also R Weissman, ‘A Long, Strange TRIPS: The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to 
Harmonize Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives Available to Third 




took the lead in creating an agenda to include US intellectual property rights protection 
abroad.22 The pharmaceutical industry engaged in aggressive lobbying campaigns on the need 
to secure greater patent protection abroad, and also through funding academic studies aimed 
at proclaiming the merits of patent protection.23 The US pharmaceutical industry’s principle 
argument was that anything less than an American-style patent protection would constitute 
stealing by other nations.24 The industry’s strategy was therefore, to persuade US policy 
makers to coerce Third World/developing countries to introduce restrictive patent laws into 
their domestic legislation.25 Needless to say, the lobbying was a great success, and the US 
government in the 1980s started introducing suitable provisions protecting intellectual 
property as an investment activity in the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) program, which it 
was negotiating with developing countries during that time.26 The US pharmaceutical 
industry also succeeded in making strict international protection of intellectual property rights 
a central goal of US international economic policy.27 The then US President Reagan in a 
message to Congress in February 1986 proposed that a key item for consideration was to seek 
much greater protection of US intellectual property interest in overseas territories.28       
The next step for the lobbyists was to move the discussion on international intellectual 
property rights protection to the GATT negotiations. In 1986, a coalition of thirteen major US 
corporations including Pfizer, Bristol-Meyers, Merck, and Johnsons & Johnson, to name a 
 
22 Drahos (n 16). The author identifies the US pharmaceutical corporation, Pfizer Inc, as taking the lead in 
lobbying through its well established business networks to disseminate the idea of a trade-based approach to IP 
rights, and later on through interlinking of the networks. The author also identifies the role played by the 
Advisory Committee on Trade Negotiations (ACTN), which was part of a private sector advisory committee 
system which was to ensure concordance between official US trade objectives and US commerce, and how the 
CEO of Pfizer Inc, and chairman of ACTN, with the help of other like minded CEOs of leading US 
corporations, was able to develop a trade and investment agenda to protect US IP rights abroad.   
23 Weissman (n 21) 1076-1077. 
24 J Kosterlitz, ‘Rx: Higher Prices’, National Journal, Vol. 25, No 7 (1993) 396-399. 
25 Ibid. Starting in 1985, the United States Trade Representative (USTR) served notice on a number of countries 
informing them about possible trade sanctions if they were to not bring their domestic patent laws into line with 
American laws. See Weissman (n 21) 1077-1078. The USTR acting under Section 301 of the Trade Act 1974, 
placed countries which did not provide adequate protection to US IP interests on its ‘watch lists’ and ‘priority 
watch lists’. The primary targets were large Third World/developing countries like, India, Argentina, Brazil, 
Taiwan and Thailand, which had begun to develop domestic industries to compete against US pharmaceutical 
manufacturers in their own markets. See also BM Berliner, ‘Making Intellectual Property Pirates Walk the 
Plank: Using Special 301 to Protect the United States’ Rights’, Loy L A Int’l & Comp L J (1990) 725-752, 727. 
The US Congress, in pursuit of a more combative approach to enforcing its IP rights overseas, enacted the 
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act (Trade Act of 1988).   
26 Drahos (n16). Towards this end, the Office of the USTR exerted extraordinary pressure on individual Third 
World countries to embrace US-style patent laws; Weissman (n 21) 1077. See also J Burgess, ‘Fighting 
Trespassing on “Intellectual Property”: U.S. Tries to Prevent Overseas Copying of Everything From Music to 
Microchips’, Washington Post (6 December 1987). The author also notes that in 1984, a trade bill was passed by 
the US Congress, which included provisions for safeguarding of IP as an important consideration in granting 
developing countries preferential tariff treatment. See also P David, ‘Intellectual Property Institutions and the 
Panda’s Thumb: Patent, Copyrights, and the Trade Secrets in Economic Theory and History’ in M Wallerstein, 
et al (eds.), Global Dimensions of Intellectual Property Rights in Science and Technology (National Academy 
Press, 1993) 20. The author observes that the United States was able to achieve considerable success in 
convincing developing and newly industrialized nations to acquiesce to its position on the treatment of various 
forms of IP with the threat of sanctions, as their retaliatory leverage was quite limited.  
27 Weissman (n 21) 1077. The author notes that it was a great success to move the policy in the direction of strict 
international IP rights protection, as traditional domain of international trade policy was primarily focused on 
tariff and related matters. See also C Reitz, ‘Enforcement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade’ U Pa 
J Int’l Econ L 17 (1996) 559-579, 555.  
28 Drahos (n 16). In a message dated 6 February 1986 and entitled ‘America’s Agenda for the Future’ President 




few, formed an ad hoc committee called Intellectual Property Committee (IPC).29 The stated 
objective of the committee in its own words was ‘dedicated to the negotiation of a 
comprehensive agreement on intellectual property in the current GATT round of multilateral 
trade negotiations.’30 WIPO, created in 1967, was the first international attempt to address 
some of the concerns relating to an international intellectual property rights movement. The 
developing countries were opposed to altering the WIPO system to strengthen intellectual 
property rights protection.31 WIPO, in the eyes of patent holding developed nations, was 
incapable of responding effectively to issues relating to intellectual property rights 
violation.32 Developed countries, including US, EC, and Japan acted fast to shift the global 
intellectual property rights administration from the WIPO to the GATT with a view to 
achieving the objective of an expanded international intellectual property rights protection 
regime. Industry groups from patent holding developed countries successfully created a 
coalition of governments that would pursue the objective of moving intellectual property 
rights regulation from WIPO to the GATT.33 The move for a global intellectual property 
rights protection mooted by developed countries and led by the US, was strongly opposed by 
developing countries including Argentina, Brazil, India, and South Africa amongst others.34 
The developing countries were strongly in favour of a WIPO-led negotiation, as opposed to a 
revision of international intellectual property rights obligations through the GATT, as the 
WIPO had traditionally been the forum for such matters.35 Patent holding businesses in the 
US, EC and Japan, successfully exerted pressure on their respective governments to ensure 
that IP rights became a global commercial issue and also the focus of attention during the 
Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations.36    
India, along with similarly placed countries like, Brazil and Argentina, strongly 
opposed the proposal on the premise that the GATT mandate did not allow for the discussion 
of substantive issues on intellectual property, and that it was only the WIPO that had the 
mandate and the institutional competence to discuss such matters.37 Also, most developing 
countries that sought membership of the WTO and entered the Uruguay round of negotiations 
 
29 Drahos (n 16). See also R Weissman, ‘Patent Plunder: TRIPing the Third World’, Multinational Monitor Vol. 
11 (November 1990) <http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/hyper/issues/1990/11/weissman.html> accessed 7 
July 2014.  
30 Drahos (n 16). See also Weissman (29). IPC’s close relationship with the USTR permitted it to shape the US 
proposals and negotiating positions during the course of the GATT negotiations. 
31 UNCTAD-ICTSD, Resource Book on TRIPS and Development (Cambridge University Press, 2005), 3. 
32 L Crump and D Druckman, ‘Turning Points in Multilateral Trade Negotiations on Intellectual property,’ 
International Negotiation Vol. 17, No. 1 (2012) 9-35, 12.  
33 Ibid. See also Drahos (n 16); TP Stewart, The GATT Uruguay Round: A Negotiating History (1986-1992), 
Vol. 3 (Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1993), 1-10.  
34 For the role played by India on behalf of the developing countries during the negotiations, see generally, J 
Sundaram, ‘India’s Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights Compliant Pharmaceutical Patent 
Laws: What Lessons for India and Other Developing Countries?’ Information & Communications Technology 
Law Vol. 23 Issue 1 (2014) 1-30. 
35 C Edgar, ‘Patenting Nature: GATT on a Hot Tin Roof’, Washburn L J, Vol. 34 (1994) 76-118. See also 
Weissman (n 21) 1083. See also Weissman (n 29). The developing countries were distrustful of GATT, which 
was largely constructed by, and dominated by industrialized countries. They favoured discussing IP rights 
protection before United Nations-affiliated organizations, such as the WIPO, where the Third World countries 
exerted greater influence. 
36 D Matthews, Globalising Intellectual Property: The TRIPS Agreement (Routledge, 2001) 7. 
37 J Watal, Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries (Kluwer Law International, 2001) 
21. See generally P Drahos, ‘Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property Standard-Setting’, 




were not granting patent monopolies for pharmaceuticals.38 India’s position, which was well 
supported by other developing countries, was that any principle or standard relating to 
intellectual property rights was to be carefully tested against the needs of developing 
countries, and that it would be inappropriate to focus the negotiations on the protection of 
monopoly rights of the owners of intellectual property rights, when almost 99% of the patents 
were owned by industrialised nations.39 Throughout the TRIPS negotiations, the US 
maintained a firm stance towards reaching a global agreement for higher levels of intellectual 
property rights protection. This position, essentially calling for the world to adopt a US-style 
patent law was developed largely by the pharmaceutical industry; according to the industries’ 
own admission.40 Although India’s position was discussed extensively at the negotiations, by 
the end of 1989 and the beginning of 1990 the developing countries were constrained to 
change their position completely, paving the way for a US-style intellectual property rights 
protection to be imposed through the GATT,41 thereby circumventing and undermining the 
authority of the WIPO. The long-drawn Uruguay round of negotiations produced the TRIPS 
Agreement, which came into force in January 1995. The Agreement can be viewed as the 
most important step in the globalization of standards of patent, trade secrets and trademark 
protection, the three areas most relevant to the success of chemical and pharmaceutical 
companies.42 Of major significance was the obligation on Member States to make available 
patents for products and processes without discrimination as to the field of technology,43 and 
requiring the introduction of product patents for chemical and pharmaceutical patents.  
 
2.2 The TRIPS Agreement: Flexibilities and the Doha Declaration  
The TRIPS Agreement which came into force on 1 January 1995, allows Member 
States to provide for a more extensive protection of intellectual property right if they wish to, 
and a minimum standard of protection from others who may not favour the idea of an 
extensive protection.44 The Agreement also contains flexibilities in its implementation, which 
is particularly aimed at developing countries and LDCs. A number of scholarly articles have 
been written on the subject of flexibilities contained in the TRIPS Agreement and the WTO’s 
failure to address the problem of the access to medicines in developing countries and LDCs. 
The patent-related flexibilities identified include provision for grant of compulsory licensing, 
parallel importation, and provisions relating to patentable subject matter, patent rights, abuse 
 
38 CM Correa, ‘Patent Rights’ in CM Correa and AA Yusuf (eds), Intellectual Property and International 
Trade: The TRIPS Agreement (2nd edn, Kluwer, 2008) 227, 229. 
39 UNCTAD-ICTSD (n 31) 7. India also stressed that substantive standards on IP rights were more in the realm 
of socio-economic and technological development, especially in the case of developing countries. It urged that 
the group focus on restrictive and anti-competitive practices of the owners of IP rights to evolve standards and 
principles for their elimination and to avoid distortion of trade. See Sundaram (n 34) 8.  
40 Weissman (n 21). 
41 See also SK Sell, ‘Cat & Mouse: Forum-Shifting in the Battle over Intellectual Property Enforcement’ (Draft, 
prepared for American Political Science Association Meeting, 3–6 September, 2009, Toronto) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1466156> accessed 9 July 2014. See also C Deere, The 
Implementation Game: The Global Politics of Intellectual Property Reform in Developing Countries (OUP, 
2009) 53. In the mid-1980s, developing countries faced pressures from both developed countries and 
knowledge-based multinational companies to agree to the inclusion of a stringent international IP commitment 
in the multilateral trading system. To break the standoff, developed countries also launched an economic and 
diplomatic offensive that ultimately forced developing countries to concede. 
42 Drahos (n 16). 
43 See Article 27.1 of TRIPS.  
44 World Intellectual Property Organization, ‘Patent Related Flexibilities in the Multilateral Legal Framework 
And Their Legislative Implementation at the National and Regional Levels,’ Committee on Development and 




of rights, and the control of anti-competitive practices.45 Some of the other flexibilities 
identified by commentators include the exhaustion of rights46 and parallel importation, scope 
of patentability and optional exclusion, exceptions to patent rights and enforcement.47 Some 
developing countries feared that the extended intellectual property rights protection granted 
for pharmaceutical patents under the Agreement was likely to increase dependency on 
multinational pharmaceutical companies and affect the developing countries and LDCs 
severely, as essential medicines could become unaffordable and beyond their reach.48 The 
developing countries were fully aware that the patent holding developed countries, which 
advocated a wider global intellectual property rights protection and promoted the TRIPS 
Agreement, had a strong public health care system and would not be affected by the 
pharmaceutical patent regime of the Agreement.   
The US and Switzerland (both holding a number of pharmaceutical patents), and well 
supported by other developed countries, took the stance that the only flexibility afforded 
under the Agreement was its staggered implementation in certain cases, but in contrast the 
developing countries were of the firm view that the TRIPS Agreement did not limit their 
sovereign powers when addressing domestic health crises, such as HIV/AIDS.49 In short, the 
impact of the TRIPS Agreement on public health in developing countries and LDCs became a 
serious issue. Due to growing pressure from the developing countries, and in particular from 
the Member States from Africa, the Council for TRIPS50 in June 2001 considered in detail the 
relationship between public health and TRIPS Agreement.51 In November 2001, the Doha 
Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health52 (Doha Declaration) was made, addressing some of 
 
45 SF Musungu and C Oh, ‘The Use of Flexibilities in TRIPS by Developing Countries: Can They Promote 
Access to Medicines?’ South Center (2006). The authors study the TRIPS flexibilities from the perspective of 
access to affordable medicines.  
46 The ‘exhaustion of patent rights’ is sometimes referred to as the ‘first-sale’ doctrine. The TRIPS Agreement 
under Articles 6 and 28(6), and the Doha Declaration under Article 5 (d) allow Member States to determine the 
scope and extent of exhaustion of patent rights. This position is strongly disputed by the US Delegation to the 
Council of TRIPS, as it holds the view that Article 6 of the TRIPS Agreement neither allows WTO Members to 
avail themselves of dispute settlement in relation to questions involving parallel imports, nor authorised parallel 
imports (Delegation of the United States, Council for TRIPS Meeting of June 1822, 2001, JOB(01)/97/Add.5, 
Council for TRIPS, 28 June 2001). See also WIPO (no 44); CM Correa, ‘The TRIPS Agreement and 
Developing Countries’ in PJ Macrory and others (eds.), The World Trade Organisation: Legal, Economic and 
Political Analysis Vol. II (Springer, 2005) 447.  
47 Deere (n 41) 75. The author suggests the development of national policies on utility models, disclosure of 
origin of genetic material and prior informed consent, and traditional knowledge (folklore and cultural heritage 
were also mentioned). 
48 Sundaram (n 5) 5. Access to essential medicines is recognised as an indispensable part of the right to health 
and is viewed as a non-delegable obligation on the part of the State, and cannot be violated based on lack of 
available resources. ‘The Selection and Use of Essential Medicines’ WHO Technical Report Series 914 (2002) 
<http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/pdf/s4875e/s4875e.pdf> accessed 9 July 2014. The developing countries and 
the LDCs were apprehensive that the TRIPS Agreement if given effect to could severely restrict access to 
essential medicines within their jurisdictions and also impede any efforts to control diseases, including 
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria.  
49 Sundaram (n 39). 
50 The legal basis for the establishment of the Council is found in Article IV.5 of the WTO Agreement, which 
stipulates that the Council ‘shall oversee the functioning’ of TRIPS Agreement. The Council for TRIPS is also 
charged with the monitoring of WTO Members’ compliance with their obligations under the TRIPS Agreement. 
See also UNCTAD–ICTSD (n 10) 739.  
51 In 1996 the World Health Assembly, which was mandated to report on the impact of the work of the WTO 
with respect to national drug policies and essential drugs, examined the relationship between public health and 
the TRIPS Agreement. See resolution on the Revised Drug Strategy, Resolution WHA 49.14 (25 May 1996). 
52 World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 
adopted on 20 November 2001 <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.pdf> 




the concerns of the developing countries, which also sought to clarify other divergent views, 
held by the Member States on the application and ambit of the TRIPS Agreement.53 Under 
the Doha Declaration, the Member States had the right to grant compulsory licences, to 
determine the grounds for the grant, and also as to what constituted a national emergency.54 
Some developing countries have made constructive use of the TRIPS flexibilities while 
giving effect to the TRIPS Agreement into their national legislations. Some countries have 
delayed the introduction of product patents into their legislation,55 and others have used the 
compulsory licensing provisions to manufacture or procure generic medicines at an 
affordable price.56 It will not be out of place to point out that the implementation of 
flexibilities in key pharmaceutical markets like, Brazil, India, and South Africa came at a 
very high price, as transnational pharmaceutical corporations, well supported by developed 
country participation, were able to mount oppositions and cause delays in the actual 
implementation.57   
 
2.3 Expansion of Intellectual Property Laws: The Haunting Colonial Legacy  
Intellectual property rights, which evolved in the Middle Ages58 was introduced by 
the industrialised colonial powers into their respective colonies and dominions from the 19th 
century. It will be beneficial for the purposes of the current study to cast our thoughts 
backwards in time to understand the role of colonialism in the expansion of intellectual 
property laws (industrial property, copyrights, and trademarks) in the 19th century in the 
former colonies.59 Some of the difficulties in accessing affordable medicines in the 
____________________ 
flexibilities embodied in the TRIPS Agreement, also helped clarify the scope of the TRIPS Agreement. See 
UNAIDS, ‘DOHA+10 TRIPS Flexibilities and Access to Antiretroviral Therapy: Lessons from the Past, 
Opportunities for the Future’, UNAIDS: Technical Brief, (ISBN: 978929173914, 2011) 6.  
53 JT Gathii, ‘The Legal Status of Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public Health under the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties’ Harv JL Tech, Vol. 15 (2002) 291-317, 292-293.  
54 The 2001 Doha Declaration, and the 2003 Decision on Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the TRIPS 
Agreement recognises the right of a country to gain access to medicines. See, Council WTO General, 
‘Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,’ Decision 
of the General Council [WT/L/540 and Corr.1] (1 September 20032003). 
55 India, one of the developing countries, has made maximum use of the flexibilities. India was able to delay the 
entry of the product patent regime into its patent laws, and ably support its generics market which was 
developed on the back of the process patent regime introduced in the Patent Act of 1970. Besides, in recent 
years India has also made use of the compulsory licensing provision introduced in TRIPS compliant legislation 
of 2005. For a detailed account see Sundaram (n 39).      
56 Brazil, one of the BRIC nations, which introduced the TRIPS compliant patent laws into its national 
legislation much earlier than others, was able to use the compulsory license provisions under the TRIPS 
compliant legislation to procure generic medicines at affordable prices for its much lauded anti-AIDS 
programme. For a detailed account see Sundaram (n 5). 
57 See generally Sundaram (n 5); Sundaram (n 39). See also, P Drahos and J Braithwaite, Information 
Feudalism: Who Owns the Knowledge Economy? (Earthscan, London 2002) 6-8. Transnational pharmaceutical 
corporations took legal action against the government of South Africa for its proposed compulsory licensing 
laws. 
58 CM Correa, ‘Managing the Provisions of Knowledge: The Design of Intellectual Property Laws’, in I Kaul, et 
al (eds.), Providing Public Goods: Managing Globalization (Oxford, 2003) 410. See F Machlup and E Penrose, 
‘The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century,’ The Journal of Economic History, Vol. X, No. 1 (1950) 1-
29, 2. The authors observe that apart from its expression in statute form (Statute of Monopolies of 1623), the 
patent system is not chiefly an English creation, as there was a rather well-developed patent system in existence 
in Venice in the 15th century, and the practice of granting monopoly privileges to inventors was widely 
followed in many parts of western and central Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries.  
59 Deere (n 47) 35. Britain introduced its then prevailing laws (including IP laws) in its colonies. Likewise, 
France too applied its own IP laws to its colonies. See also RL Okediji, ‘The International Relations of 
Intellectual Property: Narratives of Developing Country Participation in the Global Intellectual Property 




developing countries are still rooted in the colonial past, especially in the realm of intellectual 
property laws introduced during the colonial-era. The international movement on intellectual 
property standards started in the 19th century from developed countries to developing 
countries or from key industrialised Western States to developing countries/former 
colonies.60 The intellectual property laws introduced during the colonial era embodied 
concepts alien to many traditional and indigenous approaches to knowledge and innovation, 
as Western conceptions of privately held rights over intellectual assets had no local cultural 
or legal roots.61 Besides, the colonial administrators held the traditional laws of their 
dominions in low regard, as they did not serve the commercial interests of the colonizers.62     
The intellectual property laws introduced, or rather imposed, during the colonial era 
was primarily designed to protect and serve the interests of colonial administrators, and 
purely aimed at extracting wealth from the colonies rather than seeking to educate or promote 
knowledge in the colonies. Britain, during the colonial era, was keen to emphasise the 
promotion of the legal profession in its colonies to generate an English legal culture, but this 
practice was rarely extended to the realm of intellectual property laws.63 Following their 
independence from colonial rule, most developing countries in Africa chose to retain the legal 
system, the laws, and the institutions of governance established during the colonial era by the 
colonial powers, including intellectual property laws.64 In most of the former colonies, the 
establishment of national intellectual property laws only started in the wake of independence 
from colonial rule.65 In the Americas, and in some of the former Asian colonies, the era of 
decolonization also sparked efforts to substantially revise their intellectual property laws and 
related policies.66 A number of countries that emerged from colonial rule in the 20th Century 
promulgated intellectual property laws that still closely resembled earlier colonial laws or 
those of the erstwhile colonial powers.67 A few former colonies like India, moved towards a 
____________________ 
the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property was concluded in 1883, the respective colonial 
masters swept non-Western societies in Africa and Asia under the aegis of the international intellectual property 
system through the agency of colonial rule. The author also notes that despite a limited membership to the Paris 
Convention of 1883 and the Berne Convention of 1886 by developed countries, the colonies and foreign 
territories controlled by a few European sovereigns made the geographic scope of the treaties significant.    
60 Drahos (n 37). The author refers to the case of Philippines, where Spanish patent laws were introduced, but 
only to be later replaced by US patent laws. Similarly in the case of Korea, Japanese patent laws were 
introduced, but only to be later replaced by US Patent laws. Likewise, in India and Malaysia, Britain introduced 
the English patent laws in the latter part of the 19th Century and in the early part of the 20th Century.   
61 Deere (n 47) 34-35.  
62 Okediji (n 59) 322-3; Deere (n 47) 36. 
63 Deere (n 47) 36. IP laws remained largely administered from London. The former colony of India was a 
notable exception, as Britain took measures to develop a cadre of local intellectual property law experts.  
64 Okediji (n 59) 335. After independence, many developing countries and LDCs continued to have as their own 
domestic laws the old, antiquated Acts and Ordinances of the colonial era. The author also notes that given the 
socio-economic conditions in most of the former colonies, existing intellectual property laws were not a reform 
priority as they were either beneficial to the domestic industries, or were deemed irrelevant to the domestic 
public. 
65 Deere (n 47) 35. In Latin America and the Caribbean, intellectual property laws were established in the wake 
of independence from the Spanish and Portuguese in the early part of the 19th Century as opposed to the Africa, 
Asia and the Pacific, where intellectual property laws were introduced by colonial powers in the later part of the 
19th Century. The author points out that several countries in the Americas promulgated formal intellectual 
property laws far earlier than other developing countries, and indeed earlier than many developed countries. 
66 Deere (n 47) 39. 
67 Deere (n 47) 37. Former British colonies enacted copyright laws based on the same 1911 British Copyright 
Act that served as the foundation for their colonial laws. Similarly, a number of former French colonies in 
Africa adopted copyright laws that replicated those of France at the given time, and some others chose to keep 
the laws introduced during colonial rule. See also T Kongolo, ‘The African Intellectual Property Organizations: 




product patent regime during the 1970s,68 and as a result also emerged as a key player in the 
generic drugs market. In the Americas, countries like Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina lowered 
standards of patent protection to stimulate local production of generic medicines.69 Similarly, 
the Andean Community,70 comprising of former South American colonies of Chile, 
Colombia, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru followed a reformist agenda, in pursuit of a vision for 
industrial development and regional integration, and adopted common rules on foreign direct 
investment (FDI), intellectual property rights, and technology transfer.71 One can observe that 
in the post-colonial ear, the former colonies adopted different approaches towards their 
intellectual property laws and policies, where again the policies were shaped by the prevalent 
colonial legal system, besides other factors including social, economic and political 
objectives.    
During the colonial era, in the latter part of the 19th Century, the two key 
international Conventions, viz., the Paris Convention72 and the Berne Convention73 were 
codified and entered into force. The two Conventions were designed to enhance the degree of 
protection that patent rights holders from developed countries enjoyed in overseas 
jurisdictions.74 With very few developing nations participating in the negotiations, only a 
handful became parties to the two Conventions. Interestingly, almost half of the original 
signatories to the Paris Convention lacked national patent regimes at the time of ratification 
____________________ 
Vol. 3, Issue 2 (2000) 265-288, 265. The author, discussing the two major African regional IP organisations, 
viz., African Regional Industrial Property Organization (ARIPO) and Organisation Africaine de la Propriété 
Intellectuelle (OAPI), expresses the view that the systems of protection provided under the said organisations do 
not reflect the African realities. This, in the view of the author, is down to the fact that the organisations are 
modelled after the Western style of intellectual property protection which does not always correspond and fit to 
the African realities and environment.    
68 India in the 1970s moved away from the intellectual property laws introduced under British rule, based on the 
recommendations contained in the Justice Iyengar Committee report, and successfully introduced a process 
patent system as opposed to a product patent system with regards to chemical and pharmaceutical patents. But, 
this position was to change with its membership of the WTO and the introduction of TRIPS compliant 
intellectual property laws. See Sundaram (n 39); TV Garde, ‘India’ in P Goldstein and J Strauss (eds), 
Intellectual Property in Asia: Law, Economics, History and Politics (Springer, 2009). For a detailed legislative 
history of the Indian Patent Act, see generally, JM Mueller, ‘The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous 
Transformation of India’s Patent System and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation’ (2007) 68 U Pitt L 
Rev 491. 
69 Deere (n 47) 40.  
70 In 1969 the Cartagena Agreement was signed by Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. The objective 
for the Pact was the creation of a Customs Union and a Common Market. In 1996, through the Protocol of 
Trujillo, the Pact was renamed as the Andean Community. Venezuela joined the Pact in 1973, but under the 
leadership of Hugo Chavez it withdrew its membership in 2006, claiming that Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) 
signed by Colombia and Peru with the USA caused damage to the spirit of the community. Likewise, under the 
leadership of Augusto Pinochet, Chile withdrew from the Pact in 1976. Currently, it has 4 Members, 5 Associate 
Members, and one observer country.  
71 Deere (n 47) 39. 
72 The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 1883, as amended on 28 September 1979 
<http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/ip/paris/pdf/trtdocs_wo020.pdf> accessed 22 July 2014. 
73 The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 1883, as amended on 28 September 
1979 <http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/en/ip/berne/pdf/trtdocs_wo001.pdf> accessed 22 July 
2014.  
74 Deere (n 47) 36. These two treaties were also aimed at replacing the loose network of reciprocal intellectual 
property arrangements that European colonial powers had in place in some of the bilateral commercial treaties 
in the 19th century. Notably, both the Paris and Berne Conventions enshrined the principle of National 
Treatment, which provides that signatory countries shall extend to foreign nationals the same advantages, rights, 




of the Conventions.75 Brazil, one of the original signatory nations, and a former colony of 
Portugal, was an exception as it had established a patent system in the early part of the 19th 
Century.76 Through the mechanism contained in Article 19 of the Berne Convention,77 the 
former colonial powers of Britain, France, Italy, Belgium and Spain acceded their colonies to 
the Convention.78 The colonial powers were able to pick and choose the colonies that would 
be covered and the ones that would not be covered in their accession documents.79 In short, 
during the colonial-ear the colonies and dominions did not have a say in their accession 
process to the Conventions. In many cases, post-independence, the former colonies continued 
to be signatories without the actual need to be part of the regime, as they were mostly 
unaware of the necessity to have such legislations in their statute books, which were only 
designed to serve their former colonial masters. In the post-colonial era a number of larger 
developing countries were able to delay their accession to international intellectual property 
Conventions.80 A majority of developing countries in the Americas postponed adherence to 
the Paris Convention until the 1990s, as they were sceptical of the merits of intellectual 
property Conventions.81 In most of their former colonies and dominions, the colonial powers 
left behind a network of legal systems and institutions, which would in later years assist in 
the introduction of a more stringent intellectual property law regime, backed by the WTO, to 




3.1 Intellectual Property Laws: Economic Analysis vs. Human Rights 
Economic Analysis of law presents with the affordability, and at times also the 
justification of a particular law to be introduced/ implemented into a legal environment. 
While the legislature is authorised with the responsibility to enact laws, the State has the 
ultimate legal obligation to oversee the implementation of laws for the governance of the 
 
75 P Ross and G Vea, ‘The WIPO Development Agenda in a Historical and Political Context,’ in N. Netanel 
(ed.) The Development Agenda: Global Intellectual Property and Developing Countries (Oxford University 
Press (2008) 83. See also Deere (n 47) 37.  
76 Sundaram (n 5) 94; RA Brandos, ‘Brazilian Patent System: A Brief Introduction’ (INPI (National Institute of 
Industrial Property), Brazil 2012); P Drahos, The Global Governance of Knowledge: Patent Offices and Their 
Clients (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 242–43. Brazil, one of the original signatories to the Paris 
Convention had a patent regime traceable to the 19th Century. In 1809, Dom João VI, to stimulate invention in 
an economy primarily driven by agriculture, introduced a system of licensing, or alvará. Later in 1830, Brazil 
passed laws recognising the rights of inventors.     
77 The original Article 19 of the Berne Convention 1886 reads: “[1] Countries acceding to this Convention shall 
also have the right to accede thereto at any time on behalf of their colonies or foreign possessions. [2] They may 
for this purpose make either a general declaration of adhesion that includes all their colonies or possessions, or 
expressly indicate only those which are included, or which are excluded.” See also Guide to the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris Act, 1971), WIPO Publication No 615 (E), 
ISBN 92-805-0002-3 (1978) <ftp://ftp.wipo.int/pub/library/ebooks/historical-
ipbooks/GuideToTheBerneConventionForTheProtectionOfLiteraryAndArtisticWorksParisAct1971.pdf> 23 July 
2014. 
78 Deere (n 47) 37; Okediji (n 57) 324. See also Ross (n 74) 83. As a French protectorate, Tunisia was one of the 
original signatories to the Paris Convention through adherence.   
79 RL Okediji, ‘Africa and the Global Intellectual Property System: Beyond the Agency Model’, Afr YB Int’l L 
Vol 12 Issue 1 (2004) 207-251, 216-217. 
80 Deere (n 47) 41. India became a member of the Paris Convention only in 1998, and Pakistan in 2004. 
81 Ross (n 75) 84-85. The authors point out that the general view prevailing in Latin America was that there was 
no benefit in joining a convention that was not flexible enough to accommodate the needs of the local economy. 
Also, the national-treatment principle of the Paris Convention was viewed as a barrier to the design of national 
regimes dealing with industrial property. They were to become signatories to the Conventions following the 




nation in the most effective manner possible, while seeking to meet the ends of justice. Prior 
to any bill being presented before the legislature for discussion, the policy objectives are 
finalised, which again will be shaped by the policies of the political party in power at a given 
point in time. An economic analysis of any laws enacted, or is sought to be enacted, can 
always present an interesting insight into the political and economic policy objectives for the 
introduction of the law in question.      
 
3.2.1 Economic Theories of Intellectual Property, Traditional Views  
The foundations of economic theories are deeply entrenched in utilitarianism, and 
present the framework for analysis of the intellectual property rights, and in particular patent 
rights, as contained in the TRIPS Agreement. Utilitarian theorists have strongly supported the 
creation of intellectual property rights as an appropriate means to foster innovation, and in 
contrast non-utilitarian theorists had looked to the creator’s moral rights to have control over 
their work.82 The legal recognition of the grant of a patent started with the passing of the 
Statute of Monopolies of 1623,83 which also laid down the principle that only a “true and first 
inventor” should be granted a monopoly patent. Just over two hundred years after the passing 
of the Statute of Monopolies of 1623, the subject of patent reform was raised before the 
English Parliament, for the reason that the procedure for obtaining a patent was expensive, 
clumsy, and uncertain.84 This was to trigger off a debate in England, and soon to spread to the 
continent, where economists too would join in the debate, to create pro-patent and anti-patent 
lobbies.85 The lobbying and debating brought about a number of changes to the laws on 
patents both in England and in the Continent, besides witnessing the emergence of economic 
theories on the subject, with notable ones coming from England and France.  
Classical writers in England almost completely fell in line with the traditional 
principles contained in the Statute of Monopolies of 1623 that justified the grant of temporary 
monopolies for the exploitation of innovations due to their special character and function, and 
so being exempt from the prohibition of monopoly. Jeremy Bentham, regarded as the founder 
of modern day utilitarianism and also a jurist, held the view that there was “one species of 
privilege certainly very advantageous: the patents which are granted in England for a limited 
time, for inventions in arts and manufactures. Of all the methods of existing and rewarding 
industry, this is the least burthensome, and the most exactly proportioned to the merit of the 
invention.”86 He further observed, “This privilege has nothing in common with monopolies, 
which are justly decried.”87 Adam Smith, recognised as the pioneer of political economy, 
whilst referring to the risks that a company of merchants undertake and the expenses they 
incur to establish a new trade, held the opinion that the state should compensate the 
merchants by granting them “a monopoly of the trade for a certain number of years…. [to] 
 
82 PS Menell, ‘Intellectual Property: General Theories’ in B Bouckaert and G De Geest (eds.) Encyclopedia of 
Law and Economics: The History and Methodology of Law & Economics Vol. 1 (Edward Elgar 2000) 129. 
<http://encyclo.findlaw.com/1600book.pdf> accessed 28 June 2014.  
83 It is widely accepted that the policy of granting privileges of monopoly under the royal prerogative in England 
culminated in the Statute of Monopolies of 1623. See F Machlup and E Penrose, ‘The Patent Controversy in the 
Nineteenth Century,’ The Journal of Economic History, Vol. X, No. 1 (May 1950) 1-29, 3.    
84 Machlup and Penrose (n 83) 3.   
85 Machlup and Penrose (n 83) 3. Select committees of the English Parliament and Royal commissions 
investigated the operation of the patent system in 1851-1852, in 1862-1865, and again in 1869-1872. Some of 
the testimonies before the above two commissions were so damaging to the repute of the patent system that 
leading statesmen in the two houses of Parliament proposed the complete abolition of patent protection. The 
Patent Bill 1874, although passed in the House Lords, was to be withdrawn in the House of Commons. 
86 J Bentham, ‘Observation on Parts of the Declaration of Rights, as Proposed by Citizen Sieyes’ in J Bowring 
(ed.), The Works of Jeremy Bentham, Vol. II (Simpkin, Marshall & Co, London, 1843) 533.   




recompense them for hazarding a dangerous and expensive experiment, of which the public is 
afterwards to reap the benefit. A temporary monopoly of this kind may be vindicated upon 
the same principles upon which a like monopoly of a new machine is granted to its inventor, 
and that of a new book to its author.”88 He also felt such monopolies for inventions could be 
defended on the grounds of equity,89 and as far as extending the similar rights to new books 
was concerned he argued that such exclusive privilege could be regarded as “an 
encouragement to the labours of learned men” and being beneficial to the society.90  
John Stuart Mill, yet another proponent of utilitarianism, took a similar stance and 
categorically stated that “the condemnation of monopolies ought not to extend to 
patents….”91 Mill also observed that “the originator of an improved process is allowed to 
enjoy, for a limited period, the exclusive privilege of using his own improvement,” and that 
inventors should be both compensated and rewarded.92 He further argued that “…an 
exclusive privilege, of temporary duration, is preferable; because it leaves nothing to 
anyone’s discretion; because the reward conferred by it depends upon the invention’s being 
found useful, and the greater the usefulness, the greater the reward; and because it is paid by 
the very persons to whom the services is rendered, the consumers of the commodity.”93 
Whereas, Michel Chevalier, the French economist was most emphatic in his opposition of 
both tariffs and patents, declaring that both “stem from the same doctrine and result in the 
same abuses.”94 The opponents of the privilege and monopoly were able to ideologically link 
patent protectionism with tariff protectionism and patent monopoly, to argue against 
monopoly privileges, which was clearly exemplified in the views expressed by Michel 
Chevalier. On the other hand, the advocates of a strong patent protection were able to 
separate the idea of patent protection from the monopoly issue and free trade issue to present 
the case of patent protection as one of natural law and private property, and of man’s right to 
live by his work.95 David Hume argued that property has no purpose where there is 
abundance; it arises, and derives its significance, out of the scarcity of the objects that 
become appropriated, in a world in which people desire to benefit from their own work and 
sacrifice.96 Systems of Justice, he went on, protect property rights solely on account of their 
utility. Where the security of property is adequately assured, property owners generally see to 
it, that scarce ‘means’ are directed to those uses, which within their knowledge and judgment 
 
88 A Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations - Book V, Ch. 1 Part 3 (Wordsworth 
Classics of World Literature, 2012) 753-754. 
89 Ibid. Adam Smith observed, “…if the legislature should appoint pecuniary rewards for the inventors of new 
machines, etc., they would hardly ever be so precisely proportional to the merit of the invention as this is. For 
here, if the invention be good and such as is profitable to mankind, he will probably make a fortune by it; but if 
it be of no value he will also reap no benefit.”  
90 Adam Smith argued that such exclusive privileges granted to authors could be beneficial ‘if the book be a 
valuable one the demand for it in that time will probably be a considerable addition to his fortune. But if it is of 
no value the advantage he can reap from it will be very small.’ Smith (n 88).  
91 JS Mill, Principles of Political Economy with Some of their Applications to Social Philosophy (Hackett 
Publishing 2004) Book V Chapter X, Section 4, 271-272. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 
94 M Chevalier, Les brevets d'inventions dans leurs relations au principe de la liberté, du travail et de l'égalité 
(1878) 38. As cited in Machlup and Penrose (n 83) 9.   
95 Machlup and Penrose (n 83) 9. The authors, writing in 1950, observe that these arguments were still being 
used in the 20th century in debates on the issue.   
96 D Hume, Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, Section 
III, Part II (OUP, 1902) 192-204; A Plant, ‘The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions’, 
Economica, New Series, Vol. 1, No. 1 (February 1934) 30-51. See also GE Panichas, ‘Hume’s Theory of 




are most productive of what they want.97 Yet another strand of thought to emerge in the 18th 
Century and was to play an important role in the centuries to come, was that man has a 
‘natural property right’ in his own ideas. The French Constitutional Assembly in 1791 passed 
the patent laws, the preamble to which read as follows: 
 
…that every novel idea whose realization or development can become 
useful to society belongs primarily to him who conceived it, and that 
it would be a violation of the rights of man in their very essence if an 
industrial invention were not regarded as the property of its creator.98        
 
The above preamble to a greater degree captured and encapsulated the spirit of the arguments 
of the pro-patent economists who favoured the grant of a patent monopoly. The Congress in 
US was soon to follow suit with the introduction of new patent laws in 1793, which was 
based on the copyright provisions contained in its Constitution.99 It is clear that the framers of 
the US Constitution perceived the patent system as one of incentives and rewards.  
In a letter written on 13 August 1813 to the inventor Isaac McPherson, Thomas 
Jefferson expressed the view that, “[i]f nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all 
others of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea, which an 
individual may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but the moment it is 
divulged, it forces itself into the possession of every one, and the receiver cannot dispossess 
himself of it. Its peculiar character, too, is that no one possesses the less, because every other 
possesses the whole of it.”100 He further added that “…ideas should freely spread from one to 
another over the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of man, and improvement of his 
condition, seems to have been peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature, when she 
made them, like fire, expansible over all space, without lessening their density in any point, 
and like the air in which we breathe, move, and have our physical being, incapable of 
 
97 Plant (n 96).  
98 A Schuller, ‘Handbuch der Gesetze über ausschliessende  Privilegien auf neue Erfindungen’, Entdeckungen 
und Verbesserungen im Gebiete der Industrie (Vienna, 1843). As cited in Machlup (n 83) 11. One of the main 
arguments put forth by Stanislas de Bouffle at the time of presenting the bill to the French Constitutional 
Assembly in 1790 was that a man's property in his ideas was more sacred than his property in things material. 
See also Pierre Recht, ‘Le Droit d’Auteur, Une Nouvelle Forme de  Propriété: Histoire et Théorie’, Paris 
Librarie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence (1969) 39. As cited in B Bouckaert, ‘What is Property?’ Harv J L 
& Pub Pol’y (1990) 775-816, 791-792. Under this law, the right of the author to act freely with his intellectual 
product was linked with the generalization of the exclusivity for reproduction previously granted by the king to 
individual publishers. The legal protection of this exclusivity was granted to authors during their lifetimes and to 
their heirs for ten additional years. 
99 Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution expressly vests the US Congress to create 
patent and copyright laws upon a utilitarian foundation, and reads as follows: ‘To promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Rights to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries.’ This clause is also referred to as the ‘Copyright Clause.’ Although the 
actual author of the copyright clause is still unknown, most commentators believe that it was either James 
Madison or Charles C Pinckney. See K Fenning, ‘The Origin of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the 
Constitution,’ J Pat Off Soc’y Vol. 11 (1929) 438-445, 438. See also I Donner, ‘The Copyright Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution: Why Did the Framers Include It with Unanimous Approval,’ The Am J Legal Hist Vol.36 
(1992) 361-378, 361-362. Here, the author notes that at the time of the Constitutional Convention, twelve of the 
thirteen states had already enacted copyright laws.    
100 The Letters of Thomas Jefferson 1743-1826, American History: From Revolution to Reconstruction and 
Beyond [A website maintained by the University of Groningen, The Netherlands] 
<http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/presidents/thomas-jefferson/letters-of-thomas-jefferson/jefl220.php> accessed 7 
August 2014; The Founders’ Constitution [A website maintained by the University of Chicago, USA] 
<http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_8_8s12.html> accessed 7 August 2014; See also David 




confinement or exclusive appropriation.”101 Jefferson proceeds to reject the argument of the 
French philosophers that inventors and authors had a ‘natural rights’ claim to property in their 
creations. He was clear in his view that inventions cannot be a subject of property in 
nature.102 Jefferson’s comments came two decades after the passing of the first US laws on 
the subject in 1793, and also the fact that he was the principle author of the US Declaration of 
Independence and the third President of the US, cannot be ignored here.   
The mainstream economics profession have consistently argued that inventors need 
support and protection from the government for their innovations in order to maintain an 
incentive for creative inquiry. The economic justification for protection of intellectual 
property rights is founded on the premise that unless an invention or a creation is 
compensated at its full social value, there will be very little incentives to undertake or engage 
in such activities.103 Patent rights are deliberate creations of statue law, and it is the intention 
of the legislators that the beneficiary shall be placed in a position to secure an income from 
the monopoly conferred upon him by placing restrictions on the supply of the information.104 
Grant of such rights is intended to stimulate innovation by allowing the rights holder to work 
his patented product for a definite period of time to recover the investment, and also make a 
profit. Such exclusive rights are designed to empower the rights holder to prevent third 
parties from unauthorised use of the subject matter. So, one can assume that the statutes 
creating and granting patent rights monopolies would not have continued to remain in statute 
books, in the absence of a widespread expectation of public advantage from their 
operation.105 The dissenting tradition has argued that government action of any kind, 
including the awarding of copyrights and patents, is unnecessary to stimulate such activity.106  
The picture that emerges is a debate of polarised views, with one side arguing that ideas 
should benefit the public and other side arguing that individuals should benefit from their 
ideas.   
  
3.2.2 Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property Laws 
As mentioned earlier, the foundations of economic theories are deeply entrenched in 
utilitarianism, which also provides the philosophical basis for property rights, both tangible 
and intangible. This section of the article seeks to analyse some of the key economic theories 
to emerge in the 20th century on the subject of intellectual property rights which lay the 
foundations for the creation of an international intellectual property rights protection regime 
to come in the form of the TRIPS Agreement under the auspices of the WTO. This section 
will also briefly study some of the views expressed in more recent times in the 21st century. 
The term intellectual property has come to denote a whole set of intangible property rights 
which can be identified broadly under patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets. 
Currently, as it stands, the principal policy objective of intellectual property laws is the 
promotion of new and improved works through the recognition and creation of property 
 
101 David (n 26) 26. 
102 Jefferson also argued, “Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of property. Society may give an 
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rights, whether it is in the realms of expressive media, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, or 
technology, besides recognising other forms. It will, hence, be beneficial for our purposes to 
present a more contemporary analysis of the economic foundations of intellectual property 
rights and the justification for the grant of exclusive rights for inventions and other similar 
intangibles. The study will initially focus on intellectual property in general, and thereafter 
proceeding to focus on patents, more particularly on pharmaceutical patents.      
There had been a fundamental shift in conventional thinking of trade as goods-
oriented, which was brought about as a result of the sheer significance of intellectual property 
to developed economies.107 The modern day intellectual property rights principles are 
strongly modelled on the US intellectual property regime, which in turn is severely 
influenced by the pharmaceutical industry, computing industry, and music and motion picture 
industry. Today, much of the value of the leading corporate bodies in the world are estimated 
by their portfolio of intangible assets, which range from the better defined forms of 
intellectual property (patents and copyrights) to the least tangible of the intangibles (trade 
secrets, and trademarks).108 Steve Calandrillo explains the justification behind the US 
intellectual property regime as being built on the premise that it is socially desirable to 
encourage and produce many types of information, whose value to society far exceeds its 
developmental costs.109 Calandrillo asserts that most supporters of the US incentive system 
ignore the exorbitant costs it involves, and the restrictions placed upon the availability of 
information generated by the system. Needless to say, intellectual property rights generally 
confer an exclusive right to exploit the protected subject matter, or in other words, confer a 
right on the titleholder to prevent third parties from using the protected knowledge without 
authorization.110 Nonrival goods, which include knowledge,111 can be made available for 
public use, usually at low cost and sometimes at no cost. But knowledge can be made 
excludable through actions by its possessor or through legal means.112 Knowledge and 
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intellectual products are intangible and not appropriable, unlike tangible goods which can be 
appropriated and separated from the commons.113 Also, the ‘consumption’ of intangible 
goods would leave the same quantity and quality of such goods to be consumed and enjoyed 
by others.114   
As it stands, intellectual property rights are supposed to encourage innovation. Some 
authors have expressed doubts as it is difficult to establish this position, and also on the other 
hand, intellectual property rights attempts to restrict the use of knowledge in one way or 
another and poses potential impediments to diffusion and cumulative innovation.115 The 
number of patents granted in a technologically fast growing world, especially set against the 
backdrop of a globalized economy, requires a different philosophical basis and a clear set of 
theories to justify their grant than what was presented in the 19th century US and Europe, as 
the rationale for grant of a monopoly has changed.116 Until the early part of the 1990s very 
little empirical research was done on the impact of economics on public policy in the area of 
intellectual property rights, especially in comparison to the influence of professional writings 
in areas such as antitrust and taxation.117 In the intellectual property system, the patent right is 
the most powerful right, which enables the rights holder (patentee) to exclude all others from 
making, selling, or using the subject matter of a valid patent for a prescribed period of 
time.118 In practice, the patent offers the rights holder the incentive of a statutory right to 
exclude others from use as a means of inducing activity.119 It can be seen that the right of the 
patent owner is conditioned on the disclosure of the subject matter to the public when the 
patent is issued.120 Also, such rights allow the patentee to obtain the reward for the innovation 
by sale of the right conferred for a fee/royalty, or to retain the exclusive exploitation rights.121 
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Currently, under the TRIPS Agreement the term of the patent granted is for a period of 20 
years, but some pharmaceutical patent holders are known to extend this term beyond the said 
period.122   
Guido Calabresi and Ronald Coase in the 1960s were the first to attempt and apply 
economic analysis in a systematic way to areas of law that did not purport to regulate 
economic relationships.123 Edmund Kitch, a legal scholar and economist, is of the opinion 
that although good progress was made in the understanding of economics of intellectual 
property rights in the 20th century, much still remains to be done.124 Kitch, in his article, 
identifies recurring errors in the literature on the subject matter and proceeds to analyse them 
individually. He is of the strong view that writers over a period of time have repeatedly 
analysed intellectual property rights on the assumption that they confer an economic 
monopoly on the rights holder.125 Kitch observes that most authors begin with an analysis of 
intellectual property rights on the presumption that the rights holder of the intellectual 
property possesses an economic monopoly, namely, a monopoly where the rights holder is 
protected from competition and is also able to sell into a market with a downward sloping 
demand curve.126 He further argues that characterization of patents as a monopoly can only 
be true if the claims cover all of an economically relevant market, i.e., there is no alternative 
way for competitors to provide the same economic functionality to their customers without 
infringing the claims. The error that Kitch identifies in the analysis carried out by most 
writers on the subject is the use of the basic diagram/graph to study the competitive market 
where the parameters are not clearly identified, and hence “the market reflected in the 
diagram is not the market for the intellectual property right itself.”127 For Kitch, the empirical 
question if intellectual property rights confer any economic monopoly, although persistently 
raised in the literature; is not properly addressed, as it is addressed only in passing.128  
____________________ 
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Kitch also notes that much of the analysis of intellectual property rights proceeds on 
the footing that an author or inventor creates a work or an invention, who then wishes to 
exploit it commercially. This analysis, according to Kitch, conveniently leaves out of the 
equitation the interaction between intellectual property rights on any one work or invention 
and the creation of other works and inventions – in other words it forgets, or ignores the fact 
that authors make use of existing cultural elements; likewise, inventors build on the work of 
inventors who preceded them.129 Suzzane Scotchmer presents a similar, and more emphatic 
argument on the point, by stating that most innovators “stand on the shoulders of giants, and 
never more so than in the current evolution of high technologies, where almost all technical 
progress builds on a foundation provided by earlier innovators.”130 Scotchmer presents 
instances in support of her argument, from molecular biology, pharmaceuticals, computers 
and cotton gin. Scotchmer’s primary argument is that later day innovators simply bettered 
previous technologies. She also observes that most economic literature on patenting has 
proceeded to “study innovations in isolation, without focusing on the externalities or spill-
overs that early innovators confer on later innovators. But the cumulative nature of research 
poses problems for the optimal design of patent law that are not addressed by that 
perspective.”131 Based on the above, one is tempted to conclude, instantly, that it is mere 
cumulative research leading to innovation, which in the eye of the law is patentable and 
hence resulting in the ‘inventor’ being rewarded with exclusive patent rights. 
Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel Laureate in economics, observes that many of the most 
important ideas like the mathematics that underlies the modern computer, the fundamentals 
behind atomic energy, lasers, etc., are not protected by intellectual property rights, and have 
been used freely by academics and researchers, and also that academics disseminate their 
research findings without charging for them. He is also of the strong opinion that products of 
immediate commercial value can be produced without IP protection. Stiglitz argues that, in 
contrast, an IP regime rewards innovators by creating a temporary monopoly power, which 
allows the rights holder to charge far higher prices than they could possibly charge if there 
were to be a competition. He is of the further view that in the above process, ideas are used 
and disseminated far lesser than they would be otherwise.132  For Stiglitz, once a monopoly is 
established under an intellectual property regime it may be hard to dislodge, as a monopoly 
can use its market power to crush competitors, and cites Microsoft as a classic example. Fritz 
Machlup, in a study carried out on the US patent system for the Subcommittee on Patents, 
Trademarks, and Copyrights, observes that there is a general perception that ‘property’ and 
‘monopoly’ are one and the same from an economic perspective, and the rights holder of an 
invention has a ‘monopoly’ over its use just as the owner of a house has a ‘monopoly’ of the 
use of the house, which according to Machlup could encumber economic analysis.133 In his 
view, ‘property’ and ‘monopoly’ has almost nothing to do with each other, for a seller 
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owning his wares will have property but not monopoly – if others sell similar things in the 
same market. Likewise, for a seller who controls the price of what he sells in a certain 
market, as there is no serious competition, may have a monopoly but not property – if he does 
not own what he sells.134 What one need to be mindful of is that the term property, although 
used frequently in discussions, is indeed complex and highly political besides being in every 
way legal, as it vests the individual with tangible and intangible rights. 
For Landes and Posner, the standard rationale of patent law is that “it is an efficient 
method of enabling the benefits of research and development to be internalized, thus 
promoting innovation and technological progress.”135 According to Landes and Posner the 
rationale for granting legal protection to inventions is the difficulty that a manufacture may 
encounter whilst trying to recover his fixed costs of research and development when the 
product or process that embodies a new invention is readily ‘copiable’. But this protection 
presents a greater danger, as the “inventor will be enabled to charge a higher price than he 
needs to recover for the fixed costs of his invention, thereby restricting access to the 
invention more than is necessary.”136 Landes and Posner also argue that the greater the patent 
protection afforded, the smaller the benefit to competitors, as there will be very little 
information available to them and any costs of working around the patent will be higher.137 
They also assert that a patentee’s monopoly mark-up, which is influenced by the degree of 
protection afforded, bears no direct relation to the fixed costs that the patentee incurred in the 
creation of the patented product. Landes and Posner also maintain that legislation and policy 
are for the most part non-excludable public goods,138 and in contrast intellectual property is 
an excludable public good. While this is the case, the public-choice theory, seen as the 
driving force behind policy decisions, had neither succeeded in explaining the forces that 
brought into being the system of property rights that is fundamental to a capitalist economy, 
nor had it said anything about the extension of that system to encompass intellectual 
property.139  
Richard Posner, in a more recent contribution made to an on-line blog, expresses 
concerns that both patent and copyright protection, particularly the former, may be excessive. 
He argues that the cost of inventing must be comparable to the cost of copying in order to 
determine the optimal patent protection for an inventor, and that when patent protection is too 
strongly in favour of the inventor, market efficiency is decreased.140 Posner also avers that 
pharmaceutical drugs are the ‘poster child’ for patent protection, and that “few other products 
have the characteristics that make patent protection indispensable to the pharmaceutical 
industry.”141 The most interesting, if not scathing, comment to come from Posner is with 
regards to the 20-year duration of the patent protection, which he feels confers no real benefit 
– except to enable the producer to extract license fees from firms wanting to make a different 
product that incorporates his invention. Posner concludes the brief with a parting shot that the 
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need for reform of both patent and copyright laws are sufficiently acute to warrant a serious 
attention from the US Congress and the courts.142 In his view, the long protection given to 
patents under the current US laws, leads to profiteering by the rights holder, which defeats 
the very basis for the grant of a patent protection. This strong criticism can be extended to the 
20 year patent protection granted under the TRIPS Agreement, which was in turn shaped by 
the US led developed countries during the Uruguay Round of negotiations.  
From the above discussions what one can infer is that economic theories have not yet 
succeeded in producing a convincing and coherent set of principles to justify intellectual 
property protection for intangible rights. This argument can be extended to its global 
applications too, as the American intellectual property protection policy narrative has been 
embraced by developed nations and applied globally through the WTO. What we witness 
now is the evolution of intellectual property laws following the school of thought based on 
‘wealth maximization,’143 and the establishment of an international regime which provides 
strong intellectual property rights protection for innovations, which are held and exploited by 
patent holding developed nations, to the detriment of non-owners. This approach to 
intellectual property rights protection goes even beyond the utilitarian principles expounded 
by Jeremy Bentham, as it completely disregards other human values, including the needs of 
the society. While making the above criticism one cannot ignore the fact that we live in an 
information-driven society, where developed economies are strong information producers, 
and naturally expected to support the establishment of strong intellectual property rights laws 
to serve their interests. In the above landscape intellectual property rights policies emerge as 
essential organizational principles of the knowledge based economy, since it determines the 
way in which knowledge relations are structured and governed.144 The modern, or 
contemporary, perception of intellectual property rights is strongly influenced and shaped by 
US expansionist economic policies and law making. It has its foundations in utilitarianism, 
Lockean model of natural laws, besides being strongly influenced by the common law 
notions of property rights. This understanding of intellectual property, as propagated by 
Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, and later by Anglo-American jurisprudence (which in turn is 
influenced by Posnerian economic analysis from the 1970s), has paved the way for a winner-
take-all ‘wealth maximization’ approach. One should note that the US and its allies 
(developed countries with a similar vision) have a strong knowledge based economy, and can 
afford to promote an intellectual property rights regime which gives the rights holder an 
extended term of monopoly over information/knowledge, which makes any intellectual 
property product relying on such information scarce and unaffordable in the developing 
world. This approach to intellectual property, most notably, has a significant impact on the 
pharmaceutical products and affects access to medicines in developing countries and LDCs.         
    
3.3.1 Human Rights Analysis of Intellectual Property Rights & the TRIPS Agreement 
One key area of study that is constantly overlooked while discussing the importance 
of intellectual property policy and legislation is the human rights aspect for the grant of 
intellectual property rights. This lacuna in the debate on the justification for grant of property 
rights for intangibles, has particularly gained in significance in the case of pharmaceutical 
patents, as access to medicines have become a major issue since the entry into force of the 
TRIPS Agreement. As a result, there is an inadequate understanding of the complex 
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justification of intellectual property rights policy, legislation, Conventions, and most 
importantly the TRIPS Agreement, which while extending the period of patents on 
pharmaceutical and other patents to 20 years, has effectively outlawed process patents of 
pharmaceuticals. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (UDHR) provides that 
“everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from 
any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he [or she] is the author.”145 Similarly, 
the creators’ rights are also identified and recognized in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).146 Some writers have speculated that the 
protection of creators’ rights found in the above international instruments was no accident.147 
These solemn assertions are to be found in the international conventions passed post-World 
War II. Similarly, commitment to the guarantee of the right to good health is to be found in 
most national constitutions. These guarantees, or undertakings, made at the highest levels of 
governance has now been jeopardised by the development of international instruments, both 
through WTO under multilateral trade agreements, and other plurilateral agreements 
negotiated by developed nations and their trading partners. It will not be out of place to point 
out that there is no reference to human rights appearing in the Paris Convention,148 Berne 
Convention,149 the Rome Conventions,150 and in the more recently adopted TRIPS 
Agreement. Importantly, the TRIPS Agreement requires all Member States to comply with 
pre-existing international agreements on intellectual property laws including the Paris 
Convention and Berne Convention. But all the above treaties do refer to the protections 
granted to authors and inventors as ‘rights.’ Helfer and Austin argue that the principal 
justification for such rights lies not in deontological claims about the inalienable liberties of 
human beings, but rather in the economic and instrumental benefits that flow from the 
protection of intellectual property across national borders.151 
Intellectual property rights protection is alluded to in the human rights protection 
found in the cultural rights of Article 25 of the UDHR and Article 15 of the ICESR. 
Principles of human rights demand that all individuals are granted, or, are presumed to have 
the right to good health. Article 25(1) of the UDHR provides that everyone “has the right to a 
standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, 
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including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the 
right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or 
other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.”152 Likewise, Article 15.1(c) of 
the ICESCR recognises the right of the creator to “benefit from the protection of the moral 
and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he 
is the author”, and such expression entitles “both individuals or groups or communities to a 
right to intellectual property protection for his own creation.”153 Similar expressions are to be 
found in Article 27 of the UDHR regarding the individual’s right to “the protection of the 
moral and material interest resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of 
which he is the author.”154 What is glaringly missing here is the exact scope of the right to 
“scientific, literary or artistic production,” as it is unclear if it includes inventors and patent 
protection.155 When examining the implications of intellectual property rights over human 
rights, policy makers, inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations, international 
bureaucrats, and scholars usually employ the conflict approach or the coexistence 
approach.156 The first mentioned conflict approach views the two sets of rights as being in 
fundamental conflict and the coexistence approach considers them as essentially 
compatible.157 Professor Peter Yu notes that while the two approaches may have its own 
benefits and drawbacks, both ignore, or overlook the fact that “some attributes of intellectual 
property rights are protected in international or regional human rights instruments while other 
attributes do not have any human rights basis at all.”158 Interestingly, UN Sub-Commission 
on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, and the WTO has adopted the conflict 
approach and the coexistence approach respectively. Professor Yu presents a third approach 
and argues that “instead of inquiring whether human rights and intellectual property rights 
conflict or coexist with each other, it is important to identify the human attributes of 
intellectual property rights and distinguish them from the non-human rights aspects of 
intellectual property protection.”159  
The existing tensions between intellectual property rights and human rights was 
summarised by the United Nations Committee on Economics, Social and Cultural Rights in 
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2001 as follows: “The allocation of rights over intellectual property has significant economic, 
social and cultural consequences that can affect the enjoyment of human rights”.160 These 
tensions are obviously driven by the manner in which creative works, cultural heritage and 
scientific knowledge are turned into property at an alarming pace, which has significant 
human rights implications.161 Audrey Chapman expresses the strong view that intellectual 
property rights should be viewed as human rights, as the three provisions of Article 15.1(c) of 
the ICESCR were viewed by drafters as intrinsically interrelated to one another, that the 
rights of authors and creators were understood as essential preconditions for cultural freedom 
and participation and scientific progress and not as good in themselves.162 Chapman also 
argues that in order to be consistent with the provisions of Article 15, intellectual property 
laws must assure that intellectual property protections complement, fully respect, and 
promote other components of Article 15. This caveat is served so that the rights of authors 
and creators facilitate rather than constrain cultural participation on the one side and scientific 
progress and access on the other.163 For Chapman, under the human rights approach, an 
author, artist, or creator can be a group or a community as well as an individual. This 
approach strikes a balance between the rights of inventors and creators and the interests of the 
wider society within intellectual property paradigms and it makes it far more explicit and 
exacting, which means the rights of the creator are not absolute but conditional on 
contributing to the common good and welfare of society.164 There is yet another argument 
that some aspects of intellectual property rights have potentially adverse implications for 
human rights,165 which finds support in the observations made in the study carried out by the 
High Commission on Human Rights on the impact of TRIPS Agreement on human rights. 
This study acknowledges that Article 15 of the ICESCR clearly identifies the need to balance 
the protection of both public and private interests.166   
The UNHCR Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted General 
Comment 17, which elaborates on the right of everyone to benefit from the protection of the 
moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of 
which he is the author, as set out in Article 15.1(c), of the Covenant.167 It is noted in General 
Comment 17 that human rights are fundamental and inalienable, and are universal 
entitlements belonging to individuals and, under certain circumstances, groups of individuals 
and communities. It further elaborates that human rights are fundamental as being inherent to 
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the human person as such, whereas intellectual property rights are means through which 
States seek to provide incentives for inventiveness and creativity, encourage the 
dissemination of creative and innovative productions, as well as the development of cultural 
identities, and preserve the integrity of scientific, literary and artistic productions for the 
benefit of society as a whole.168 The most interesting comments come in paragraph 2 of the 
General Comments, where it is stated that human rights are timeless expressions of 
fundamental entitlements of the human person, whereas intellectual property rights are of a 
temporary nature, and can be revoked, licensed or assigned to third parties, and can also be 
allocated, limited in time and scope, traded, amended and even forfeited.169 Besides, the 
scope of protection of the moral and material interests of an author provided for by Article 
15.1(c), does not necessarily coincide with what is referred to as intellectual property rights 
under national legislations or international instruments, and hence, it is important that 
intellectual property rights are not sought to be balanced with the human right recognized in 
Article 15.1(c).170 A bare reading of the above international instruments causes confusion, as 
intellectual property rights are identified as human rights, which has a far wider scope to 
achieve than the narrow private proprietorial right envisaged under intellectual property 
rights. This has undermined the position of the advocates of human rights who see 
intellectual property rights being given preference over their right to good health and life in 
the debate on access to affordable medicines. While the above debate rages on; the expanded 
intellectual property rights protection imposed through the WTO had caused unnecessary 
hardship and suffering in the developing countries and LDCs due to scarcity of access to 
affordable medicines. What is obvious from the above discussion is that the relationship 
between intellectual property rights and human rights remains unclear171 to the greatest 
disadvantage of the real sufferers from the exploitation of intellectual property rights by 
transnational corporations.   
Most Member States of the WTO who have undertaken to implement the minimum 
standards of intellectual property protection in the TRIPS Agreement have also ratified the 
ICESR, which means the Member States have a double duty to implement the minimum 
standards of the Agreement bearing in mind their human rights obligation.172 The question 
that we ask is should the Member States interpret the Agreement as only safeguarding trade 
interests, or should it be read in light of the importance of upholding the needs and interests 
of all market actors, including corporations and individual human beings?173 Importantly, do 
all international instruments, including the specialist TRIPS Agreement strike a right balance 
between human rights and intellectual property rights? Sadly, the literature available on the 
point seems to indicate that they do not strike a balance, and one can assume that intellectual 
property rights have a more favoured position than human rights in the debate. Finding a link 
between the standards of TRIPS and human rights is not the same as saying that TRIPS takes 
a human rights approach to intellectual property protection; the primary question is whether 
TRIPS strikes a balance that is consistent with a human rights approach.174 The Resolution 
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2000/7 of the UN Commission on Human Rights on IP and human rights goes as far as to 
state that the WTO is “a veritable nightmare” for certain sectors of humanity,175 in that the 
TRIPS Agreement in some ways encourages, or has as a side-effect human rights 
violations.176 The report concludes thus:  
 
“Since the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement does not 
adequately reflect the fundamental nature and indivisibility of all 
human rights, including the right of everyone to enjoy the benefits of 
scientific progress and its applications, the right to health, the right to 
food and the right to self- determination, there are apparent conflicts 
between the intellectual property rights embodied in the TRIPS 
Agreement, on the one hand, and international human rights law on 
the other”.  
 
The above Resolution of the Sub-Commission on Human Rights also identifies the 
areas of actual or potential conflict between human rights and intellectual property rights as, 
impediments resulting from the application of intellectual property rights to the transfer of 
technology to developing countries; the consequences of plant variety rights and the patenting 
of genetically modified organisms for the enjoyment of the basic right to food; the reduction 
of control by communities (especially indigenous communities) over their own genetic and 
natural resources and cultural values, leading to accusations of ‘biopiracy’; restrictions on 
access to patented pharmaceuticals and the implications for the enjoyment of a basic right to 
health.177 The Resolution goes further to affirm the right to protection of the moral and 
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which one is 
the author as a human right, which is however subject to limitations in the public interest. A 
year later in 2001, Resolution 2001/21,178 was adopted wherein it was noted that the 
implementation of TRIPS did not adequately reflect the fundamental nature and indivisibility 
of all human rights, including the right of everyone to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress 
and its applications, and that there are apparent conflicts between the intellectual property 
rights regime embodied in TRIPS, on the one hand, and international human rights law, on 
the other. The resolution also recommended that an assessment be made to study if the patent 
‘as a legal instrument’ was compatible with the promotion and protection of human rights; 
and the impact of the TRIPS Agreement on the rights of indigenous peoples. It is relevant to 
point out here that both Resolutions, 2000/7 and 2001/21, of the Sub-Commission observe 
that human rights prevailed  over all economic rights and should be taken into account in the 
drafting of economic rights policies.179 Sadly, not much progress has been made since the 
making of the above two resolutions.   
It is abundantly clear that there exists an apparent conflict between the ‘private’ 
interests of intellectual property rights holders, which is contained in the TRIPS Agreement, 
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and the ‘social’ or ‘public’ concerns found in international human rights law.180 The TRIPS 
Agreement has successfully tilted the balance inherent in intellectual property law away from 
the public interest and in favour of intellectual property rights holders.181 One of the major 
shortcomings of the TRIPS Agreement is that it does not have the promotion and protection 
of human rights at the heart of the aim of intellectual property protection, but rather more as 
an exception. The promotion of health, nutrition, etc., which are links to human rights, are all 
generally expressed in terms of exceptions to the rule.182 Further, TRIPS Agreement only 
recognises individual rights by clearly stating in the preamble that intellectual property rights 
are private rights, which ignores the creativity and innovation of groups and communities.183 
This position undoubtedly weakens the objectives on human rights contained in the 
Agreement. As observed by Dutfield and Suthersanan, the resolutions and reports produced 
by the UN Commission on Human Rights in the area of intellectual property rights have been 
unanimous in their view that there was a need for law makers to take international human 
rights into account in international economic policy formulation, and emphasised the primacy 
of the former over the latter.184 The authors also point out that none of the resolutions and 
reports suggest that intellectual property rights per se conflict with human rights, but rather 
that the problems lie in the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement, and that the implication 
is that there must be a concerted attempt to interpret TRIPS as if human rights norms and 
considerations were part of the drafting process.185  
The right to health as found in international instruments, due to its indeterminacy and 
vagueness, makes it appear more aspirational rather than justiciable and hence difficult to 
implement at the national level,186 and it is hence important to clarify the position of the right 
to health and its remit in international instruments. UDHR and other international instruments 
view intellectual property rights as part and parcel of human rights, or in other words 
intellectual property rights are seen as being contained in human rights. This position only 
favours those seeking a much stronger and wider intellectual property rights protection, 
which effectively side-lines all other social and public concerns at the heart of the human 
rights argument. As Michael Santoro points out, negative rights require the duty holder to 
“…forbear from interfering with the right holder” but whereas positive rights like the right to 
health care will require someone to act for, or provide something to the right holder.187 This, 
according to Santoro “raises the question of who exactly has a duty to honour the human right 
to drugs.”188 The problem clearly appears to be the mistake of trying to balance out private 
rights (negative rights) with the right to health (positive right). Here, the right to health 
suffers a setback, as the private right that is sought to be balanced with it is also described as 
a human right, which it is not in actual terms. Thomas Pogge argues that the current 
international rules which are shaped by developed/wealthier countries contribute to massive 
deprivations among the disadvantaged, and are therefore unjust, and those responsible for the 
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design and imposition of the said rules are not merely failing to protect human rights, but are 
actively violating the rights of billions.189 He further urges the developed nations to work 
toward reform or to compensate for the harm caused. 
 
3.2.2 Access to Medicines as Human Right 
Improving access to affordable medicines in the developing countries and LDCs had 
been on the agenda of international bodies for well over four decades, resulting in the 
adoption of resolutions and declarations. These resolutions and declaration meant a clear 
commitment from developed nations and developing nations to devote time and resources to 
address the issue of access to medicines. In the 1980s, HIV/AIDS, a previously unknown 
disease, affected populations across the globe, with the most vulnerable populations coming 
from the developing and least developed parts of the world. While progress has been made in 
the treatment of the disease, it still remains inaccessible to a majority of the population who 
suffer from it. Those affected by HIV/AIDS but with access to the best treatment options still 
live in developed countries, and those with little or no access to medicines and treatment live 
in developing countries and LDCs. The developed countries hold the patent rights to most 
medicines which offer the best treatment options possible for the treatment of HIV/AIDS. By 
moving the protection of intellectual property rights (which importantly includes 
pharmaceutical patents) from the remit of the WIPO to the WTO, and extending the patent 
protection to 20 years, the developed countries have made access to life saving medicines 
even more difficult to achieve, both in the short and long term. These changes made in the 
late 1980s to ensure intellectual property rights protection was granted at a global level, saw 
the introduction of the TRIPS Agreement, which in some ways seeks to strike a balance 
between intellectual property rights and access to medicines. The TRIPS Agreement has 
instead struck a discord, and has only made access to life saving medicines an even more 
difficult task to achieve in developing countries and LDCs.  
The clash between human rights and intellectual property is clearly epitomized by the 
issue of access to patented medicines.190 The problems faced in access to medicines in 
developing countries and LDCs have presented the stark realities of the ills of an extended 
international protection regime for intellectual property rights, more particularly 
pharmaceutical patent protection, as the cost of access to affordable medicines, as opposed to 
an available cure has clearly contributed to the loss of lives of innocent human beings. The 
developed nations who advocated the wider, global intellectual property protection at the 
WTO will not be affected by the rising cost of access to affordable medicines, as they do 
have in place a robust health care system through which they also administer the access to 
medicines to its citizens. For instance, in developed countries, antiretroviral drugs (ARVs) 
have “transformed AIDS from a death sentence to a chronic illness and saved thousands of 
lives,” but in sharp contrast, even at the reduced price of $300 per year the drugs remain out 
of reach for the 25 million Sub-Saharan Africans suffering from HIV and AIDS.191 
 
189 T Pogge, ‘Access to Medicines,’ Pub Health Ethics Vol.1, No. 2 (2008) 73-82, 74. 
190 Helfer and Austin (n 145) 90. 
191 ‘Paying the Price’ (Television Trust for the Environment, U.S. Release 2002). <http://tve.org/films/paying-
the-price/index.html> accessed 22 August 2014. See also McClellan (n 190) 154. See also Dean T. Jamison et 
al., ‘Cost-Effective Strategies for the Excess Burden of Disease in Developing Countries,’ in Priorities in 
Health (World Bank, 2006) 59-95. <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK10258/> accessed 22 August 
2014. The authors argue that many of the diseases and health conditions that account for a large part of the 
disease burden in low- and middle-income countries are far less common in high-income countries. Also, 
according to the authors, just eight diseases and conditions account for 29 percent of all deaths in low- and 
middle-income countries, namely, TB, HIV/AIDS, diarrheal diseases, vaccine-preventable diseases of 




Unfortunately, for the AIDS patients in developing countries and LDCs, the ARVs for 
frontline treatment are inaccessible due to its exorbitant price, which again is fixed by 
transnational pharmaceutical corporations.192 The only option available in such countries is 
the use of affordable generics, the procurement of which in some instances has become 
highly problematic.193 It is also to be noted that the production and procurement of generics 
has almost been outlawed by the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement. Patients from 
developing countries and LDCs suffer most from the impact of the TRIPS, as the 
implementation of the Agreement has seen the price of patented drugs rise exponentially in a 
very short time, defying any logic. 
Professor Graham Dutfield identifies poverty as the main reason for not being able to 
access medicines, and governments, even those that are not corrupt or otherwise woefully 
dysfunctional, lack the resources and infrastructure to get them to those who need medicines 
but cannot afford them.194 These factors, according to Dutfield, are used cleverly by the 
pharmaceutical industry to stave off any argument that patent rights allow them to set high 
prices that keep life-saving drugs out of the reach of the poor.195 In the 21st Century 
globalised economy, the existence of medicines, or cure, does not guarantee their 
accessibility to the poor and needy in developing countries and LDCs, who were compelled 
to embrace an intellectual property regime under the TRIPS Agreement which is to their 
absolute disadvantage. The idea of withholding life-saving drugs from individuals suffering 
from fatal or debilitating diseases when the means exist to distribute those drugs cheaply and 
effectively is anathema to all notions of morality.196 Pogge refers to TRIPS as a ‘notorious’ 
Agreement, which had globalised a monopoly patent regime, which keeps the prices of 
advanced medicines much higher than the long-run cost of production by suppressing generic 
competition. He also argues that this excludes the global poor from access to vital medicines 
for the sake of enhancing the incentives to develop new medicines for the affluent.197 It 
should not be forgotten that under international human rights laws, the right to health 
includes elements related to healthcare – which includes access to medicines, curative and 
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preventive health care, and other aspects related to a number of ‘underlying preconditions for 
health.’198 In this regard the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) 
interpreted the understanding of the ‘highest attainable standard of health’ as “a right to the 
enjoyment of a variety of facilities, good, services and conditions necessary for the realisation 
of the highest attainable standard of health,”199 and access to necessary medicines should be 
understood in light of this explanation. This would mean that the ‘Right to Highest Attainable 
Standard of Health’ should include the of “provision of equal and timely access to basic 
preventive, curative, rehabilitative health services and health education; …; appropriate 
treatment of prevalent diseases, illness, injuries and disabilities; the provision of essential 
drugs; and…”200 In this sense, medicines, as a basic means for the guarantee of people’s 
enjoyment of health should be made available to ensure the realisation of the right to health, 
and implies that the right to health encompasses a minimum and universal right to affordable 
essential medicines.201  
It can be argued that the developing countries and LDCs had their chance to put their 
cases across when the TRIPS Agreement was negotiated in the Uruguay Round of 
negotiations prior to its entry in 1995, and that the negative effect of the TRIPS Agreement, if 
any on access to medicines, were addressed by the TRIPS Council and off-set through the 
Doha Declaration made in 2001. Unfortunately, this argument is not sustainable, as a level 
playing field was glaringly absent during the Uruguay Round of negotiations (a factor 
discussed earlier in this article), which effectively gave away the advantage to the advocates 
of an international intellectual property rights protection regime. The negotiation and entry of 
TRIPs in 1995 empowered a particular group of actors, namely developed countries led by 
the US, to successfully embed their preferred way of governing IP rights in the TRIPs 
agreement.202 Pogge argues that the Agreement cannot be just, and highlights the fact that 
representatives of a number of acceding governments included individuals such as Suharto 
(Indonesia), Mugabe (Zimbabwe), Sani Abacha (Nigeria), Mobutu Sese Seko (Democratic 
Republic of Congo), and Burma’s SLORC junta, who could not have represented the best 
interests of the people they were ruling.203 Supporting Pogge, one can argue that large 
democracies like India, Brazil, South Africa etc., represented by democratically elected 
governments, opposed the very entry of patent protection into the WTO on the grounds that 
the right place for matters relating to IP rights protection was the WIPO, while also warning 
that it could cause serious harm to the populations residing in developing countries and LDCs 
in their access to affordable medicines. The developing countries were in for a rude shock, 
when the negotiated trade-off agreed with the developed countries to sign the TRIPS 
Agreement did not materialise.204 Pogge also argues that by globalizing the pharmaceutical 
patent regime the advanced nations have imposed a very costly loss of freedom on the global 
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poor, thereby cutting off poor patients from their generic drug supply and exposing billions of 
vulnerable people to heightened risk of death and disease.205  
Stiglitz observes that while he was serving in the Council of Economic Advisors 
under the Clinton Administration, it was “clear that there was more interest in pleasing the 
pharmaceutical and entertainment industries than in ensuring an intellectual-property regime 
that was good for science, let alone for developing countries.”206 He also notes that the trade 
negotiators who framed the IP agreement of the Uruguay Round of negotiations in the early 
1990s were “either unaware of all this, or more likely, uninterested.”207 These shocking 
observations sheds light on the general mood prevalent at the highest level of trade 
negotiation, where the framers were totally unaware of such problems of access to medicines, 
and also not so keen in discussing such issues. Several investigations carried out in the pre-
WTO era had clearly demonstrated that the protection of intellectual property right is 
disproportionately more important to the chemical and pharmaceutical industries.208 It is 
obvious that at the root of the TRIPS Agreement lies the persistent tension between the 
economic powerhouses that seek to commodify and appropriate more intellectual goods into 
the private property realm and those who seek the dissemination of such intellectual goods 
into the ‘intangible commons’ for public use and the protection of the public domain more 
generally.209 The TRIPS Agreement and its imposition are plainly unjust and will, in terms of 
the magnitude of harm caused, top the ratings of the largest human rights violations in 
history.  
A discussion on access to essential medicines will not be complete without 
mentioning the role of free trade agreements (FTAs), plurilateral agreements, and TRIPS-plus 
provisions, which have caused serious harm and also posed fresh problems. The threat to 
access to medicines, both actual and perceived, does not stop with the introduction of 
multilateral agreements which were instrumental in the introduction of a higher international 
intellectual property rights protection, but continues to grow with the forging of FTAs and 
other plurilateral agreements. These agreements cannot now be seen as a mere ‘threat’, as 
they have clearly evolved to become concrete barriers to the access to affordable medicines in 
developing countries and LDCs. The only international organization where such matters can 
now be debated is the WTO, which administers the TRIPS Agreement and other covered 
agreements of the multilateral trading system. The WTO, needless to say, does not have any 
control over the FTAs nor other plurilateral agreements affecting access to medicines in 
developing countries and LDCs. In this regard the loss of WIPO’s governance over the 
administration of international intellectual property rights protection is lamentable, and the 
actions of the developed countries in moving the governance from the WIPO to the WTO in 
the late 1980s can only be seen as a calculated move to serve the interest of ‘rights owning’ 
countries. To some degree it can also be asserted that the developing countries and the LDCs 
have been traded off to benefit the intellectual property right holders. The US strategy on 
such matters has always been to directly influence and constrain the pharmaceutical coverage 
programmes of its trading partners.210 There is also a strong view that an ‘informal empire’ 
has been built on a legal framework by the developed countries, particularly the US, by virtue 
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of their obvious economic supremacy, by dictating the terms of international legal rules and 
also at the same time interpreting the said rules in a form suitable to their own interests 
without any realistic challenge.211  
If the TRIPS Agreement was a well concerted effort by the developed countries and 
their transnational pharmaceutical corporations, then, the TRIPS Agreement flexibilities and 
the Doha Declaration were a hard fought bargain by the developing countries, LDCs and 
NGOs. One of the main concerns for some of the developing countries during the 
negotiations was the requirement of a sudden transition from a process patent regime to a 
product patent regime. The TRIPS Flexibilities were built into the TRIPS Agreement to 
benefit the developing countries and LDCs while implementing the Agreement into their 
national laws. This was intended to take away the strain of imposing a higher intellectual 
property rights regime upon jurisdictions which were not fully prepared to embrace a much 
higher standard than the one in place in the domestic legislation. As discussed earlier the 
TRIPS flexibilities afforded a delayed implementation, the use of compulsory licensing, etc., 
but in actual practice it had been extremely difficult, or even impossible, for the developing 
countries to implement. A combination of factors, namely, the TRIPS-plus provisions 
introduced through FTAs, political pressure from developed countries through trade 
sanctions, and pressure from transnational pharmaceutical companies – either through 
protracted court proceedings, and or lobbying, have robbed the developing countries and the 
LDCs from exercising their rights under the TRIPS Agreement. It can be argued that 
pharmaceutical patent holding developed countries have used the TRIPS Agreement to 
effectively set a bench-mark on intellectual property standards and have exploited the loop-
holes in the multilateral trading system, which allows for regional trade agreements, to 
effectively prevent the developing countries from implementing the TRIPS flexibilities.  
 
3.2.3 Implementation of Paragraph 6 and the Proposal for Amendments 
It would be pertinent here to discuss the implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha 
Declaration and the proposed amendments to the Agreement made in 2005. Many developing 
countries and LDCs do not have the manufacturing capacity and, or the economic viability to 
either produce active ingredients, or formulations, and hence cannot avail the provision of 
‘compulsory licenses’ under the TRIPS Agreement. Also, the option of importing generic 
medicines from other countries is restricted in the Agreement which requires production 
under compulsory licence to be predominantly for the supply of the domestic market. 
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration reads as follows: “WTO members with insufficient or 
no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making 
effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement.” Recognizing the 
problem, the Doha Declaration directed the Council for TRIPS to find an expeditious solution 
and to report back to the General Council before the end of 2002. After nearly two years of 
negotiations, on 30 August, 2003,212 the General Council of the WTO finally adopted the 
Decision on Implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS 
Agreement and Public Health (the August Decision). The paragraph 6 solution is essentially 
an interim waiver with regard to the obligations under 31 (f) and (h)213 of the TRIPS 
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Agreement, which allows for the total quantity of drugs produced under a compulsory licence 
to be exported. Any implementation of the Decision will require carrying out changes to 
national laws, and also ensuring that countries do not assume TRIPS-plus obligations under 
bilateral or regional trade agreements (RTAs).214 Since August 2003, the Council for TRIPS 
had met annually to review the implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration, and 
as per paragraph 8, “with a view to ensuring its effective operation, and shall annually report 
on its operation to the General Council.” This waiver under paragraph 6 shall terminate on 
the date on which an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement replacing its provisions takes 
effect for a member.215 However, on 6 December 2005 the WTO Member States reached an 
agreement on the amendment to the TRIPS Agreement.216 This proposal, if and when given 
effect to, will make the temporary waiver of Article 31(f) of the Decision taken on 30 August 
2003, a permanent feature. Any decision to review the TRIPS Agreement can only be 
enforced if the protocol to amend the Agreement is accepted by a two third majority of the 
Member States, and the said Protocol will be kept open for acceptance by Member States 
until 31 December 2015.  
With almost a year to go, only 53 Member States (as of 31 July 2014) have desired an 
amendment of the Agreement.217 This in itself is a worrying development, as a number of 
developing countries and LDCs who are being affected, and will be affected even more in the 
coming months and years, have not expressed their wish for an amendment to the Agreement. 
Given the fact what is sought to be made permanent is the temporary waiver brought under 
paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration, which will pave the way for exporting and importing 
generic drugs under the compulsory licensing provision of the TRIPS Agreement it is a real 
concern that there is very little engagement in this regard from the developing countries and 
LDCs. This clearly demonstrates, not an indifference towards the issue, but an ignorance of 
the magnitude of the problem that the TRIPS Agreement had brought about in the access to 
medicines in the developing countries and LDCs. This takes us back to a point made earlier – 
if there had been a level playing field at the Uruguay Round of negotiations when the TRIPS 
was taken up for discussions; and all the Ministerial representatives at the GATT conversant 
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and aware of the shortcoming of the proposal that was being negotiated, there would not have 
been an agreement on an enlarged international intellectual property rights protection regime 
through the WTO. Most of the sub-Saharan African countries suffer due to lack of access to 
medicines, but a mere 6 Member States have expressed their desire for an amendment.218 
Sadly, a majority of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa rely on generic drugs for treatment, 
and do not possess the necessary infrastructure to manufacture any generic drugs that they 
need for frontline treatment. Africa as a continent will stand to benefit through a full support 
of the amendment to the TRIPS Agreement from its WTO Member States. It is yet to be seen 
if the 31 December 2015 deadline will come to pass, or if the proposed amendment, as in the 
past, will get another extension.     
 
3.2.4 Transnational Pharmaceutical Corporations & the Right to Life Saving Medicines  
From the foregoing discussion one can conclude that the key player behind the 
creation of a global intellectual property rights protection was the transnational 
pharmaceutical corporations who hold patent rights to pharmaceutical patents for the 
medicines required in the treatment of diseases in the world. Importantly, the consumers of 
patented pharmaceutical goods are spread all over the world, and more so in the developing 
countries and LDCs. Patients in developing countries and LDCs suffer most from the impact 
of the TRIPS Agreement, as the implementation has seen the price of patented drugs rise 
exponentially within a very short time, defying any logic. This situation has resulted in 
medicines becoming unaffordable and beyond the reach of even governmental agencies in 
developing countries and LDCs. As mentioned earlier, the most affected patients of the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic come from developing countries or LDCs where frontline treatment is 
unaffordable due to the above factor. Stiglitz argues that one of the reasons for high costs of 
medicines “…is that the patent system impedes access to lifesaving drugs for billions.”219 
Stiglitz also argues that one of the main reasons the transnational pharmaceutical industry 
was pushing for TRIPS was that they wanted to reduce access to generic medicines, as the 
prices of generic drugs are very low and are favoured over the much higher priced patented 
drugs.220 And also, any competition with the generics drugs will drive down the price of the 
brand name drugs. Stiglitz observes that the lower prices in turn lowers the profits of the 
brand name pharmaceutical companies, and that it is understandable why the transnational 
pharmaceutical corporations pushed so hard and also contributed for international IP rights 
protection.221  
Patients in developed countries do not face a similar fate, as they boast of a well-
defined health care system, where medicines are affordable (through prescriptions), and also 
medical treatment is well regulated by their respective governments. The same cannot be said 
about any of the developing countries or LDCs. The voice from the developing countries that 
we hear is not for free medicine but for the access to affordable medicines. It should be seen 
as the failure of the WTO to develop an adequate solution to the AIDS issue which is 
emblematic of a broader truth about global intellectual property rights and the developing 
world.222 To a greater degree, the WTO, as an agency of the United Nations (UN) and the 
 
218 Ibid. It should be noted that the African Continent is still in the grip of HIV/AIDS and most number of deaths 
are still reported in Africa than in any other Continent in the world. The non-availability of affordable ARVs 
still remains as the main problem in the fight against HIV/AIDS.   




222 P Drahos and J Braithwaite, ‘Three Tests of US Trade Policy on Intellectual Property Rights’, Nth Position 




world governing body that administers the TRIPS Agreement, should be made accountable in 
its failure in not finding an effective solution to access to medicines in most of its Member 
States, and more particularly in developing countries and LDCs, where patent protection is 
compulsorily extended to pharmaceutical products through the TRIPS Agreement. The 
argument that Doha declaration was especially formulated to address this issue, and that 
flexibilities were built into the TRIPS Agreement to address the specific issue cannot be 
sustained, as they have proven to be ineffective in most cases. As Stiglitz observes the 
transnational pharmaceutical corporations and FTAs have made the grant of compulsory 
licenses difficult. He further argues that “had the intention been to retain access to lifesaving 
generic medicines for developing countries, TRIPS would have provided for an automatic 
right to issue compulsory licenses for expensive, life-saving medicines.”223  In his opinion 
when the trade ministers signed the TRIPS Agreement “…in the spring of 1994, they were in 
effect signing the death warrants on thousands of people in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere 
in the developing countries.”224 Sherry Marcellin notes that the making of the patent 
provision under TRIPS Agreement represents an instance of institutional capture by private 
interests, dominated by American industry.225  
A thorough study of the actual investment into research and development (R&D), 
marketing and the cost of patented drugs offered for sale by transnational pharmaceutical 
corporations in developing countries is to be undertaken to have a clear picture of the cost 
benefit ratio of the research, investment, the cost of production and benefit derived by the end 
user. This again is subject to data being made available by the by transnational 
pharmaceutical corporations. Worryingly, there is a lack of transparency in the 
pharmaceutical business sector, and also the fact transnational pharmaceutical corporations 
take advantage of the loopholes in the international legal system to conceal valuable data 
from public scrutiny makes it harder for a study. Any report available from such a study will 
have the potential to challenge the argument of ‘patents encourage innovation in the medical 
sector’ used to justify the pharmaceutical corporations. Pharmaceutical industry 
representatives have long defended patents rights as the ‘lifeblood of our industry – we 
literally could not exist without them.’226 Given the great importance the transnational 
pharmaceutical sector places on patents, it is not surprising that it stands alone in its 
involvement with the patent system and also has done much to ensure that the system meets 
its requirements.227 According to Lipton, the patent driven approach in the pharmaceutical 
industry has been linked to healthcare access in developing countries in that the costs of 
pharmaceutical products, directly or indirectly increase the national budget of developing 
countries for medicines “…and constitute a hindrance to the effective provision of health care 
by public authorities.”228 Some have even argued that since disease impairs normal human 
functioning, it restricts a person's range of opportunities to pursue a career, and that by 
preventing, curing, or ameliorating disease, therefore, adequate health care helps to guarantee 
fair equality of opportunity.229 Most importantly, the current commercial patent model as 
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practiced by the pharmaceutical industry results in a gross inadequacy of appropriate R&D 
for medicines and vaccines required to tackle diseases that may be peculiar to developing 
countries.230 Stiglitz and Jayadev argue that the major problem with the current private 
property model of patenting prohibiting the existence of rival products without the permission 
of the patent right holder is that it can act as a barrier to knowledge and slow down the pace 
of new and socially desirable discoveries.231 This observation defeats the argument for 
extending pharmaceutical patent protection in developing countries and LDCs as very little 
R&D is carried out by transnational pharmaceutical corporations into diseases prevalent in 
developing countries and LDCs.  
Patent holding transnational pharmaceutical corporations are viewed as complex 
organisations which exceed their goals and functions, but in non-utilitarian ways.232 Umahi 
and Osuji observe that transnational pharmaceutical corporations are seen as a major 
impediment to access to essential lifesaving medicines in developing countries.233 In their 
view Article 27234 of the TRIPS Agreement lays down a very wide primary provision that 
creates exclusive rights affecting virtually every aspect of the availability and affordability of 
medicines. As observed by Justice Jacobs, such exclusive rights prop “an arms race in which 
the weapons are patents.”235 A judicial observation from Justice Jacobs in the above lines is a 
damnifying verdict on the global patent system. In Umahi and Osuji’s opinion it is a race 
which developing countries lack the capacity to compete in effectively, as they try to protect 
the interests of the consumers of pharmaceutical processes and products. The authors propose 
as a way-forward the creation of an effective access to medicines corporate social 
responsibility (CSR)236 framework for pharmaceutical companies which could include 
pricing, patents, testing and clinical trials, research and development, joint public private 
initiative and appropriate use of drugs. They also argue that the CSR of multinational 
pharmaceutical companies in developing countries should reflect context, opportunity, 
proximity, time and impact in accordance with the social integration and ethical approaches 
to CSR.237 These suggestions go a long way in approaching the inequalities created by the 
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implementation of the TRIPS Agreement. Sadly, what we are witnessing is a modern day 
David and Goliath situation, where diminutive David is losing out fast against the patent 





The neoclassical worldview that what is good for business is also good for the society 
is not sustainable, as the economic foundations of the patent system, or the justification for a 
monopoly protection for private rights at the cost of public good and human rights is ill-
founded. Jagdish Bhagwati, the renowned economist and an advocate of free-trade, argues 
that the TRIPS Agreement does not belong in the WTO, as it enforces payment by the poor 
countries (consumers) to the rich countries (intellectual property producers), and that by 
introducing the TRIPS through the WTO “we legitimated the WTO to extract royalty 
payments.”238 Bhagwati, declaring support for the NGO statement ‘asking for the IP leg of 
the WTO to be sawn off,’ also observed that the WTO must be about mutual gains in trade, 
but whereas intellectual property protection, introduced through the TRIPS Agreement, is a 
tax on poor countries, constituting a wealth transfer to the rich countries, that has turned the 
WTO into a royalty-collection agency.239 As observed by Stiglitz, the importance of 
intellectual property rights are exaggerated, and they form only one part of our innovation 
system, and that they should be seen “as part of a portfolio of instruments.”240 Stiglitz further 
argues that there is an immediate need to strengthen the other elements of this portfolio and 
redesign the current intellectual property regime to increase its benefits and reduce its costs. 
Martin Khor, while advocating for a review of the TRIPS Agreement, argues that the agenda 
should include the “question of its removal from the WTO so that the trade organisation can 
return to its mission of promoting balanced trade options.”241  
Earlier in the discussion, it was noted how transnational corporations led by patent 
holding pharmaceutical corporations, and ably backed by developed countries successfully 
shifted the forum for international intellectual property rights protection from the WIPO to 
the WTO during the Uruguay Round of negotiations. Not stopping with the shift in the 
forum, as argued by Marcellin,242 the patent holding pharmaceutical corporations through the 
developed country representation have resorted to an ‘institutional capture,’ which in effect 
had resulted in a stalemate with the no possibility of a renegotiation of the TRIPS Agreement 
at the WTO. Not only have the transnational patent holding corporations been successful in 
shifting the forum from the WIPO to the WTO and in the eventual creation of the TRIPS 
Agreement, but also taking absolute control of the administering body through the developed  
country Member States. In the foregoing paragraphs we discussed the access to 
medicines/public health implications of an enforced international intellectual property rights 
protection regime on the Member States of the WTO, and also there being no real consensus 
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as to the impact of patent protection on the growth of technology.243 Instead of engaging in a 
debate if the intellectual property rights protection will lead to increased innovation and 
foreign investment in developing countries,244 or if current drug prices are justified by the 
need for future research and development,245 it would be hugely beneficial to engage in a 
serious study of the harms of an expanded international intellectual property rights protection 
on global public health concerns as a human right. The need of the hour is a thorough 
examination of the philosophical foundations for an international intellectual property rights 
vis-à-vis that of the foundations to public right to health, as the utilitarian basis of intellectual 
property rights protection seem to completely neglect the rights of the individual to the 
enjoyment of the public good.  
        
4.2 Discussion and Conclusion  
The economic analysis of intellectual property laws are inconclusive as regards their 
benefit to society, as there is a division in the perception of what is public good, and if 
intellectual property would constitute a public good. From the above discussion, it is that the 
current international intellectual property regime, which is modelled on the US intellectual 
property laws, and as promoted by the WTO through the TRIPS Agreement, has caused and 
continues to cause enormous difficulties for the developing countries and LDCs through its 
implementation. The TRIPS Agreement’s implementation has also helped the pharmaceutical 
corporations to create a false demand and increase the price of patented pharmaceutical 
products. This raises the question if the international intellectual property regime’s economic 
justification to society’s welfare has been overstated and overshadows the harm it causes to 
societies in developed countries and LDCs. What is clear, though is that under the current 
regime, information is patentable (also heavily patented), and comes at a very high price, and 
consumers you pay tax and royalty to the developed countries on everything one consumes 
on a daily basis. Information is knowledge, and it does not come free but at a high price. This 
leads us to the question, if it was at all necessary for the WTO to move towards a global 
product patent regime in the first place? As discussed earlier, the idea or, more precisely the 
template was mooted by transnational pharmaceutical corporations ably backed by other 
patent holding corporations and developed countries to move towards a product patent 
regime. This model was designed to create a two tier system, which comprises the patent 
holders and consumers amongst the WTO Member States, where the globally spread 
consumers (mostly located in developing countries and LDCs) pay a royalty to the patent 
holders based in developed countries. The TRIPS regime also effectively outlaws the generic 
drugs industry through the introduction of a product patent system, which had been the 
mainstay for developing countries and LDCs, offering access to affordable medicine for their 
health care needs. It is well documented that transnational pharmaceutical corporations have 
hindered the movement of generic drugs through the misuse of EU regulations in the past,246 
although there was nothing to prove that the generic drugs transported violated any existing 
patent laws. In the post-TRIPS era, the transnational pharmaceutical corporations have 
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challenged such TRIPS compliant legislations sought to be implemented in developing 
countries (through the backing of developed countries), which they view as being harmful to 
their business interests.247 These actions were resorted to, both before the respective domestic 
courts in the developing countries and before the WTO through developed country 
representation. These tactics have resulted in delaying the introduction of TRIPS compliant 
patent legislation or, thwarting the introduction of suitable legislation for growth and for 
implementation of health care policies in the developing countries.        
The argument that intellectual property rights are important for the society will 
become unacceptable if the right to access to affordable medicine is not addressed by the 
WTO immediately. Soon, the LDCs too will be required to implement the TRIPS Agreement, 
thereby presenting a much more acute problem than what is being faced at the moment. The 
model of multilateral trade promoted and practiced under the WTO through the covered 
agreements is such that, it does not allow the WTO to either contain, or to respond quickly to 
any social inequalities created by the operation of the covered agreements. This is well 
demonstrated by the fact that the WTO has no control over transnational pharmaceutical 
corporations, who have the developed countries as their mouthpiece, or over developed 
countries that enter into FTAs with strong TRIPS-plus provisions. Further, it is not possible 
for the WTO to check the proliferation of FTAs and RTAs as they are not prohibited under 
the GATT, but the Member States are only obligated to declare/notify the creation of RTAs. 
The developing countries are caught between a rock and a hard place in their struggle to gain 
access to affordable medicine. What we witness is an international organisation, whose 
institution is not capable of addressing issues of urgent and absolute importance at a war 
footing. Although the above study focuses more on the problems surrounding pharmaceutical 
patents and access to medicines, the conclusions that one is tempted to draw is that the 
current global intellectual property regime as designed and introduced under the TRIPS 
Agreement is only capable of benefitting the patent holding developed Member States of the 
WTO and of great disadvantage to the non-patent holding developing country and LDC 
Member States of the WTO.    
What one has to note is that intellectual property rights through its close association 
with the growth of technology and the media holds a popular position and has been 
glamorised by its proponents. Unfortunately, human rights and related issues do not enjoy the 
same luxury that intellectual property rights enjoy. Human rights has come to be associated 
with images of the poor and suffering in the third world, and may not have the same glamour 
or public appeal as intellectual property rights. The topic of HIV/AIDS is not anymore 
frontline news in developed countries, as it is treatable and manageable with frontline ARVs, 
but in sharp contrast it is a day-to-day problem in developing countries and LDCs where 
access to frontline ARV treatment is unaffordable as the pharmaceutical patents are held by 
transnational pharmaceutical corporations from one of the developed countries. It should be 
borne in mind that the losses that developing countries and LDCs suffer as a result of the 
international intellectual property rights protection does not stop with access to affordable 
medicines, but include issues such as access to cultural and educational material, patented 
seeds and food products, protection of traditional knowledge and indigenous materials, 
computer software, and knowledge per se. As Professor Peter Yu notes, the difference 
between lack of access to medicines and the lack of access to cultural and educational 
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materials is “like the difference between dying now and dying slowly later.”248 On the 
aforementioned discussions and on the strength of available evidence, it is high time for a 
complete rethink on the TRIPS Agreement as a covered agreement of the WTO, if not as an 
immediate measure to remove its application to pharmaceutical patents. In the absence of a 
positive action on the part of the WTO to revise the TRIPS Agreement, or in the alternative to 
remove pharmaceutical patent protection from the ambit of TRIPS, as a way forward, the 
BRIC countries, the LDCs and similar interest groups should form working groups/FTAs to 
promote and safeguard their interests.   
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From: Jae Sundaram <jae.sundaram@buckingham.ac.uk> 
To: 'INDIRA CARR' <imcarr@btinternet.com>  
Sent: Monday, 1 December 2014, 9:32 




Many thanks for the message.  
  
I will definitely look into the draft [2a] in more detail and carry out necessary corrections. I am in the 
middle of marking (our exams started on Saturday…), and I should be able to get back to you by next 
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To: Jae Sundaram 




Version 2a was the one that was reviewed. A number of typos and syntax errors were notices. the 
paper is a good introduction to the philosophical debates surrounding TRIPs. I would be very pleased 
to publish it in ICTL but I would like you at go through the paper including the footnotes and send 
me a corrected version. 
  
Apologies for the delay.  
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Please find attached a more updated version of the article where I have carried out some 









From: Jae Sundaram 
Sent: 03 September 2014 11:57 
To: 'Indira Carr' 
Subject: Article - First Draft 
Dear Indira 
  
I hope you are doing fine. I am attaching two copies of my first draft of the article I have been 
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